This occurred in February, 1864, and by this time Palmerston’s utterances, made against the wish of the majority of his Cabinet colleagues (though this was not known), had so far aroused the British public as to have created a feeling, widely voiced, that Great Britain could not sit idly by while Prussia and Austria worked their will on Denmark.  There was excellent ground for a party attack to unseat the Ministry on the score of a humiliating “Danish policy,” at one time threatening vigorous British action, then resorting to weak and unsuccessful diplomatic manoeuvres.  For three months the Government laboured to bring about through a European council some solution that should both save something for Denmark and save its own prestige.  Repeatedly Palmerston, in the many parliamentary debates on Denmark, broke loose from his Cabinet colleagues and indulged in threats which could not fail to give an excellent handle to opponents when once it became clear that the Ministry had no intention of coming in arms to the defence of the Danish King.

From February to June, 1864, this issue was to the fore.  In its earlier stages it did not appear to Southern sympathizers to have any essential bearing on the American question, though they were soon to believe that in it lay a great hope.  Having set the Southern Independence Association on its feet in London and hoping much from its planned activities, Lindsay, in March, was momentarily excited over rumours of some new move by Napoleon.  Being undeceived[1171] he gave a ready ear to other rumours, received privately through Delane of the Times, that an important Southern victory would soon be forthcoming[1172].  Donoughmore, the herald of this glad news also wrote: 

“Our political prospects here are still very uncertain.  The Conference on the Danish question will either make or mar the Government.  If they can patch up a peace they will remain in office.  If they fail, out they go[1173].”

Here was early expressed the real hope of one faction of extreme Southern friends in the Danish question.  But Lindsay had not yet made clear where he stood on a possible use of a European situation to affect the cause of the South.  Now, as always, he was the principal confidant and friend of Mason in England, but he was on ordinary political questions not in sympathy with Tory principles or measures.  He was soon disgusted with the apathy of the London Independence Association and threatened to resign membership if this organization, started with much trumpeting of intended activity, did not come out boldly in a public demand for the recognition of the South[1174].  He had already let it be known that another motion would be made in Parliament for mediation and recognition and was indignant that the Association did not at once declare its adherence.  Evidently there were internal difficulties.  Lindsay wrote Mason that he retained membership only to prevent a break up of the Association