the calibre of Mr. Adams one feels inclined to marvel at his success.  The astonishment ceases when one reflects that the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs is Earl Russell[1151].”

But when, on February 23, the debate on the Laird Rams occurred[1152], the Tory leaders, upon whom Lindsay and others depended to drive home the meaning of the Alexandra decision, carefully avoided urging the Government to change its policy and contented themselves with an effort, very much in line with that initiated by The Index, to belittle Russell as yielding to a threat.  Adams was even applauded by the Tories for his discretion and his anxiety to keep the two countries out of war.  The Southern Independence Association remained quiescent.  Very evidently someone, presumably Derby or Disraeli, had put a quietus on the plan to make an issue of the stoppage of Southern ship-building.  Russell’s reply to his accusers was but a curt denial without going into details, in itself testimony that he had no fear of a party attack on the policy of stopping the ships.  He was disgusted with the result of the Alexandra trial and in conversation with Adams reflected upon “the uncertainty and caprice incident everywhere to the administration of justice[1153].”

As between Russell and Seward the waters formerly troubled by the stiff manner and tone of the one statesman and the flamboyance of the other were now unusually calm.  Russell was less officious and less eager to protest on minor matters and Seward was less belligerent in language.  Seward now radiated supreme confidence in the ultimate victory of the North.  He had heard rumours of a movement to be made in Parliament for interposition to bring the war to an end by a reunion of North and South on a basis of Abolition and of a Northern assumption of the Confederate debts.  Commenting on this to Lyons he merely remarked that the Northern answer could be put briefly as:  (1) determination to crush rebellion by force of arms and resentment of any “interposition”; (2) the slaves were already free and would not be made the subject of any bargain; (3) “As to the Confederate debt the United States, Mr. Seward said, would never pay a dollar of it[1154].”  That there was public animosity to Great Britain, Lyons did not deny and reported a movement in Congress for ending the reciprocity treaty with Canada but, on Seward’s advice, paid no attention to this, acknowledging that Seward was very wise in political manipulation and depending on his opposition to the measure[1155].  Some alarm was indeed caused through a recurrence by Seward to an idea dating back to the very beginning of the war of establishing ships off the Southern ports which should collect duties on imports.  He told Lyons that he had sent a special agent to Adams to explain the proposal with a view to requesting the approval of Great Britain.  Lyons urged that no such request be made as it was sure to be refused, interpreting the plan as intended