of sympathy for either North or South, yet going out of his way to pass a moral judgment on the disaster to political liberty if the North should wholly crush the South, was positive in assertion that it would be unwise to adopt either Roebuck’s motion or Montagu’s amendment.  Great Britain should not commit herself to any line of policy, especially as military events were “now occurring” which might greatly alter the whole situation, though “the main result of the contest was not doubtful.”  Here spoke that element of the Ministry still convinced of ultimate Southern success.

If Gladstone’s had been the only reply to Roebuck he and his friends might well have thought they were about to secure a ministerial change of front.  But it soon appeared that Gladstone spoke more for himself than for the Government.  Roebuck had made a direct accusation and in meeting this, Layard, for the Foreign Office, entered a positive and emphatical denial, in which he was supported by Sir George Grey, Home Secretary, who added sharp criticism of Roebuck for permitting himself to be made the channel of a French complaint against England.  It early became evident to the friends of the South that an error in tactics had been committed and in two directions; first, in the assertion that a new French offer had been made when it was impossible to present proof of it; and second, in bringing forward what amounted to an attempt to unseat the Ministry without previously committing the Tories to a support of the motion.  Apparently Disraeli was simply letting Roebuck “feel out” the House.  The only member of the Tory party strongly supporting him was Lord Robert Cecil, in a speech so clearly a mere party one that it served to increase the strength of ministerial resistance.  Friends of the North quickly appreciated the situation and in strong speeches supported the neutrality policy of the Government.  Forster laid stress upon the danger of war and the strength of British emancipation sentiment as did Bright in what was, read to-day, the most powerful of all his parliamentary utterances on the American war.  In particular Bright voiced a general disbelief in the accuracy of Roebuck’s report of his interview with Napoleon, called upon his “friend” Lindsay for his version[1090] of the affair, and concluded by recalling former speeches by Roebuck in which the latter had been fond of talking about the “perjured lips” of Napoleon.  Bright dilated upon the egotism and insolence of Roebuck in trying to represent the Emperor of France on the floor of the House of Commons.  The Emperor, he asserted, was in great danger of being too much represented in Parliament[1091].

The result of this first day’s debate on June 30 was disconcerting to Southern friends.  It had been adjourned without a vote, for which they were duly thankful.  Especially disconcerting was Slidell’s refusal to permit the citation of Mocquard’s note in proof of Roebuck’s assertions.  Mason wrote: