of Military History at Sandhurst College, published in 1863, an analysis of American campaigns, centering all attention on the battles in Maryland and Virginia and reaching the conclusion that the South could resist, indefinitely, any Northern attack[1077].  He dismissed the western campaigns as of no real significance.  W.H.  Russell, now editor of the Army and Navy Gazette, better understood Grant’s objectives on the Mississippi but believed Northern reconquest of the South to the point of restoration of the Union to be impossible.  If, however, newspaper comments on the success of Southern armies were to be regarded as favourable to Roebuck’s motion for recognition, W.H.  Russell was against it.

“If we could perceive the smallest prospect of awaking the North to the truth, or of saving the South from the loss and trials of the contest by recognition, we would vote for it to-morrow.  But next to the delusion of the North that it can breathe the breath of life into the corpse of the murdered Union again, is the delusion of some people in England who imagine that by recognition we would give life to the South, divide the nations on each side of the black and white line for ever, and bring this war to the end.  There is probably not one of these clamourers for recognition who could define the limits of the State to be recognized....  And, over and above all, recognition, unless it meant ‘war,’ would be an aggravation of the horrors of the contest; it would not aid the South one whit, and it would add immensely to the unity and the fury of the North[1078].”

The British Foreign Secretary was at first little concerned at Roebuck’s motion, writing to Lyons, “You will see that Roebuck has given notice of a motion to recognize the South.  But I think it certain that neither Lord Derby nor Cobden will support it, and I should think no great number of the Liberal party.  Offshoots from all parties will compose the minority[1079].”  Russell was correct in this view but not so did it appear to Southern agents who now became active at the request of Roebuck and Lindsay in securing from the Emperor renewed expressions of willingness to act, and promptly, if England would but give the word.  There was no real hope that Russell would change his policy, but there seemed at least a chance of replacing the Whig Ministry with a Tory one.  The date for the discussion of the motion had been set for June 30.  On June 13, Lindsay, writing to Slidell, enclosed a letter from Roebuck asking for an interview with Napoleon[1080], and on June 16, Mason wrote that if Slidell saw the Emperor it was of the greatest importance that he, Mason, should be at once informed of the results and how far he might communicate them to “our friends in the House[1081].”  Slidell saw the Emperor on June 18, talked of the possibility of “forcing the English Cabinet to act or to give way to a new ministry,” asked that an interview be given Lindsay and Roebuck, and hinted that Lord Malmesbury, a warm friend of the Emperor, would probably be the Foreign Secretary in a Tory cabinet.  Napoleon made no comment indicating any purpose to aid in upsetting the Palmerston Government; but consented to the requested interview and declared he would go to the length of officially informing the British Ministry that France was very ready to discuss the advisability of recognizing the South[1082].