In the face of this ultimatum, Spence advised yielding as he “could not hesitate ... seeing that nothing could be so disastrous politically, as well as financially, as the public break-down of the Loan[1068].”  Mason gave the required authorization and this was later approved from Richmond.  For a time the “bulling” of the loan was successful, but again and again required the use of funds received from actual sales of bonds and in the end the loan netted very little to the Confederacy.  Some $6,000,000 was squandered in supporting the market and from the entire operation it is estimated that less than $7,000,000 was realized by the Confederacy, although, as stated by the Economist, over $12,000,000 of the bonds were outstanding and largely in the hands of British investors at the end of the war[1069].

The loan soon became, not as had been hoped and prophesied by Slidell, a source of valuable public support, but rather a mere barometer of Southern fortunes[1070].  From first to last the Confederate Cotton Loan bore to subscribers the aspect of a speculative venture and lacked the regard attached to sound investment.  This fact in itself denied to the loan any such favourable influence, or “financial recognition of the Confederacy,” as Mason and Slidell, in the first flush of success, attributed to it.  The rapid fluctuations in price further discredited it and tended to emphasize the uncertainty of Southern victory.  Thus “confidence in the South” was, if anything, lessened instead of increased by this turning from political to financial methods of bringing pressure upon the Government[1071].

Southern political and parliamentary pressure had indeed been reserved from January to June, 1863.  Public attention was distracted from the war in America by the Polish question, which for a time, particularly during the months of March and April, 1863, disturbed the good relations existing between England and France since the Emperor seemed bent on going beyond British “meddling,” even to pursuing a policy that easily might lead to war with Russia.  Europe diverted interest from America, and Napoleon himself was for the moment more concerned over the Polish question than with American affairs, even though the Mexican venture was still a worry to him.  It was no time for a British parliamentary “push” and when a question was raised on the cotton famine in Lancashire little attention was given it, though ordinarily it would have been seized upon as an opportunity for a pro-Southern demonstration.  This was a bitter attack by one Ferrand in the Commons, on April 27, directed against the cotton manufacturers as lukewarm over employees’ sufferings.  Potter, a leading cotton manufacturer, replied to the attack.  Potter and his brother were already prominent as strong partisans of the North, yet no effort was made to use the debate to the advantage of the South[1072].