[Footnote 1016:  Lyons Papers, April 27, 1863.  Lyons wrote:  “The stories in the newspapers about an ultimatum having been sent to England are untrue.  But it is true that it had been determined (or very nearly determined) to issue letters of marque, if the answers to the despatches sent were not satisfactory.  It is very easy to see that if U.S. privateers were allowed to capture British merchant vessels on charges of breach of blockade or carrying contraband of war, the vexations would have soon become intolerable to our commerce, and a quarrel must have ensued.”]

[Footnote 1017:  Parliamentary Papers, 1863, Commons, LXXII.  “Memorial from Shipowners of Liverpool on Foreign Enlistment Act.”]

[Footnote 1018:  Ibid.]

[Footnote 1019:  U.S.  Diplomatic Correspondence, 1863, Pt.  I, pp. 308-10.]

[Footnote 1020:  The despatch taken in its entirety save for a few vigorous sentences quite typical of Seward’s phrase-making, is not at all warlike.  Bancroft, II, 385 seq., makes Seward increasingly anxious from March to September, and concludes with a truly warlike despatch to Adams, September 5.  This last was the result of Adams’ misgivings reported in mid-August, and it is not until these were received (in my interpretation) that Seward really began to fear the “pledge” made in April would not be carried out.  Adams himself, in 1864, read to Russell a communication from Seward denying that his July 11 despatch was intended as a threat or as in any sense unfriendly to Great Britain.  (F.O., Am., Vol. 939, No. 159.  Russell to Lyons, April 3, 1864.)]

[Footnote 1021:  Parliamentary Papers, 1864, Commons, LXII.  “Correspondence respecting iron-clad vessels building at Birkenhead.”]

[Footnote 1022:  See next chapter.]

[Footnote 1023:  State Department, Eng., Vol. 83, No. 452, and No. 453 with enclosure.  Adams to Seward, July 16, 1863.]

[Footnote 1024:  Rhodes, IV, 381.]

[Footnote 1025:  Many of these details were unknown at the time so that on the face of the documents then available, and for long afterwards, there appeared ground for believing that Adams’ final protests of September 3 and 5 had forced Russell to yield.  Dudley, as late as 1893, thought that “at the crisis” in September, Palmerston, in the absence of Russell, had given the orders to stop the rams. (In Penn.  Magazine of History, Vol. 17, pp. 34-54.  “Diplomatic Relations with England during the Late War.")]

[Footnote 1026:  Rhodes, IV, p. 382.]

[Footnote 1027:  The Times, Sept. 7, 1863.]

[Footnote 1028:  Ibid., Editorial, Sept. 16, 1863.  The Governmental correspondence with Lairds was demanded by a motion in Parliament, Feb. 23, 1864, but the Government was supported in refusing it.  A printed copy of this correspondence, issued privately, was placed in Adams’ hands by persons unnamed and sent to Seward on March 29, 1864.  Seward thereupon had this printed in the Diplomatic Correspondence, 1864-5, Pt.  I, No. 633.]