FOOTNOTES: 

[Footnote 966:  In other respects, also, this question of belligerent ship-building and equipping in neutral ports was, in practice, vaguely defined.  As late as 1843 in the then existing Texan war of independence against Mexico, the British Foreign Secretary, Aberdeen, had been all at sea.  Mexico made a contract for two ships of war with the English firm of Lizardi & Company.  The crews were to be recruited in England, the ships were to be commanded by British naval officers on leave, and the guns were to be purchased from firms customarily supplying the British Navy.  Aberdeen advised the Admiralty to give the necessary authority to purchase guns.  When Texas protested he at first seemed to think strict neutrality was secured if the same privileges were offered that country.  Later he prohibited naval officers to go in command.  One Mexican vessel, the Guadaloupe, left England with full equipment as originally planned; the other, the Montezuma, was forced to strip her equipment.  But both vessels sailed under British naval officers for these were permitted to resign their commissions.  They were later reinstated.  In all this there was in part a temporary British policy to aid Mexico, but it is also clear that British governmental opinion was much in confusion as to neutral duty in the case of such ships.  See my book, British Interests and Activities in Texas, Ch.  IV.]

[Footnote 967:  Bullock, Secret Service under the Confederacy.]

[Footnote 968:  Bernard, Neutrality of Great Britain during the American Civil War, p. 338-9.]

[Footnote 969:  Parliamentary Papers, 1863, Commons, LXXII.  “Correspondence respecting the ‘Alabama.’” Also ibid., “Correspondence between Commissioner of Customs and Custom House Authorities at Liverpool relating to the ‘Alabama.’” The last-minute delay was due to the illness of a Crown adviser.]

[Footnote 970:  State Department, Eng., Vol. 81, No. 264.  Adams to Seward, Nov. 21, 1862.]

[Footnote 971:  Selborne, in his Memorials:  Family and Personal, II, p. 430, declared that in frequent official communication with all members of the Cabinet at the time, “I never heard a word fall from any one of them expressive of anything but regret that the orders for the detention of the Alabama were sent too late.”  Of quite different opinion is Brooks Adams, in his “The Seizure of the Laird Rams” (Proceedings, Mass.  Hist.  Soc., Vol.  XLV, pp. 243-333).  In 1865 his father, the American Minister, made a diary entry that he had been shown what purported to be a copy of a note from one V. Buckley to Caleb Huse, Southern agent in England, warning him of danger to his “protege.”  “This Victor Buckley is a young clerk in the Foreign Office.” (Ibid., p. 260, note.)]

[Footnote 972:  Fox, Confidential Correspondence, I, p. 165.  Fox to Dupont, Nov. 7, 1862.]