At Washington also anxiety was again aroused by the court’s decision in the Alexandra case, and shortly after the great Northern victories at Vicksburg and Gettysburg, Seward wrote a despatch to Adams, July 11, which has been interpreted as a definite threat of war.  In substance Seward wrote that he still felt confident the Government of Great Britain would find a way to nullify the Alexandra decision, but renewed, in case this did not prove true, his assertion of Northern intention to issue letters of marque, adding a phrase about the right to “pursue” Southern vessels even into neutral ports[1019].  But there are two considerations in respect to this despatch that largely negative the belligerent intent attributed to it:  Seward did not read or communicate it to Lyons, as was his wont when anything serious was in mind; and he did not instruct Adams to communicate it to Russell.  The latter never heard of it until the publication, in 1864, of the United States diplomatic correspondence[1020].

In London, on July 11, Adams began to present to Russell evidence secured by Consul Dudley at Liverpool, relative to the Rams and to urge their immediate seizure.  Adams here but performed his duty and was in fact acting in accordance with Russell’s own request[1021].  On July 16 he reported to Seward that the Roebuck motion for recognition of the South[1022] had died ingloriously, but expressed a renewal of anxiety because of the slowness of the government; if the Rams were to escape, Adams wrote to Russell, on July 11, Britain would herself become a participant in the war[1023].  Further affidavits were sent to Russell on August 14, and on September 3, having heard from Russell that the Government was legally advised “they cannot interfere in any way with these vessels,” Adams sent still more affidavits and expressed his regret that his previous notes had not sufficiently emphasized the grave nature of the crisis pending between the United States and Great Britain.  To this Russell replied that the matter was “under serious and anxious consideration,” to which, on September 5, in a long communication, Adams wrote that if the Rams escaped:  “It would be superfluous in me to point out to your Lordship that this is war.”

The phrase was carefully chosen to permit a denial of a threat of war on the explanation that Great Britain would herself be participating in the war.  There is no question that at the moment Adams thought Russell’s “change of policy” of April was now thrown overboard, but the fact was that on September 1, Russell had already given directions to take steps for the detention of the Rams and that on September 3, positive instructions were given to that effect[1024], though not carried out until some days later.  There had been no alteration in the “new policy” of April; the whole point of the delay was governmental anxiety to secure evidence sufficient to convict and thus to avoid attack for acting in contradiction to those principles which had been declared to be the compelling principles of non-interference in the case of the Alabama.  But so perfect were the arrangements of Captain Bullock that complete evidence was not procurable and Russell was forced, finally, to act without it[1025].