This was Russell’s interpretation of the American plan and he saw in it a very great danger to British commerce and an inevitable ultimate clash leading to war.  Such, no doubt, it was Seward’s desire should be Russell’s reaction, though never specifically explaining the exact purpose of the privateers.  Moreover, nine-tenths of the actual blockade-running still going on was by British ships, and this being so it was to be presumed that “privateers” searching for possible blockade runners would commit all sorts of indignities and interferences with British merchant ships whether on a blockade-running trip or engaged in ordinary trade between non-belligerent ports.

Immediately on learning from Lyons details of the privateering bill, Russell had instructed the British Minister at Washington to raise objections though not formally making official protest, and had asked for explanation of the exact nature of the proposed activities of such vessels.  Also he had prepared instructions to be issued by the Admiralty to British naval commanders as to their duty of preventing unwarranted interference with legitimate British commerce by privateers[1009].  The alteration of governmental policy as indicated in the arrest of the Alexandra, it might be hoped, would at least cause a suspension of the American plan, but assurances were strongly desired.  Presumably Russell knew that Adams as a result of their conversations, had recommended such suspension, but at Washington, Lyons, as yet uninformed of the Alexandra action, was still much alarmed.  On April 13 he reported that Seward had read to him a despatch to Adams, relative to the ships building in England, indicating that this was “a last effort to avert the evils which the present state of things had made imminent[1010].”  Lyons had argued with Seward the inadvisability of sending such a despatch, since it was now known that Russell had “spoken in a satisfactory manner” about Confederate vessels, but Seward was insistent.  Lyons believed there was real cause for anxiety, writing: 

“A good deal of allowance must be made for the evident design of the Government and indeed of the people to intimidate England, but still there can be little doubt that the exasperation has reached such a point as to constitute a serious danger.  It is fully shared by many important members of the Cabinet—­nor are the men in high office exempt from the overweening idea of the naval power of the United States, which reconciles the people to the notion of a war with England.  Mr. Seward for a certain time fanned the flame in order to recover his lost popularity.  He is now, I believe, seriously anxious to avoid going farther.  But if strong measures against England were taken up as a Party cry by the Republicans, Mr. Seward would oppose very feeble resistance to them.  If no military success be obtained within a short time, it may become a Party necessity to resort to some means of producing an excitement