On April 7, Russell wrote to Lyons: 

“The orders given to watch, and stop when evidence can be procured, vessels apparently intended for the Confederate service will, it is to be hoped, allay the strong feelings which have been raised in Northern America by the escape from justice of the Oreto and Alabama[1007].”

It thus appears that orders had been issued to stop, on evidence to be sure, but on evidence of the vessels being “apparently intended” for the South.  This was far from being the same thing as the previous assertion that conclusive evidence was required.  What, then, was the basic consideration in Russell’s mind leading to such a face-about on declared policy?  Chagrin at the very evident failure of existing neutrality law to operate, recognition that there was just cause for the rising ill-will of the North, no doubt influenced him, but more powerful than these elements was the anxiety as to the real purpose and intent in application of the American “privateering” Bill.  How did Russell, and Lyons, interpret that Bill and what complications did they foresee and fear?

As previously stated in this chapter, the privateering Bill had been introduced as an “administration measure” and for that reason passed without serious debate.  In the Cabinet it was opposed by Welles, Secretary of the Navy, until he was overborne by the feeling that “something must be done” because vessels were building in England intended to destroy the blockade.  The Rams under construction were clearly understood to have that purpose.  If privateers were to offset the action of the Rams there must be some definite plan for their use.  Seward and Adams repeatedly complained of British inaction yet in the same breath asserted that the privateers were intended to chase and destroy Alabamas—­a plan so foolish, so it seemed to British diplomats, as to be impossible of acceptance as the full purpose of Seward.  How, in short, could privateers make good an injury to blockade about to be done by the Rams?  If added to the blockading squadrons on station off the Southern ports they would but become so much more fodder for the dreaded Rams.  If sent to sea in pursuit of Alabamas the chances were that they would be the vanquished rather than the victors in battle.  There was no Southern mercantile marine for them to attack and privateering against “enemy’s commerce” was thus out of the question since there was no such commerce.

There remained but one reasonable supposition as to the intended use of privateers.  If the Rams compelled the relaxation of the close blockade the only recourse of the North would be to establish a “cruising squadron” blockade remote from the shores of the enemy.  If conducted by government war-ships such a blockade was not in contravention to British interpretation of international law[1008].  But the Northern navy, conducting a cruising squadron blockade was far too small to interfere seriously with neutral vessels bringing supplies to the Confederacy or carrying cotton from Southern ports.  A “flood of privateers,” scouring the ocean from pole to pole might, conceivably, still render effective that closing in of the South which was so important a weapon in the Northern war programme.