Lyons’ reports reached Russell before Seward’s instruction was read to him.  Russell had already commented to Adams that American privateers would find no Confederate merchant ships and that if they interfered with neutral commerce the United States Government would be put in an awkward position.  To this Adams replied that the privateers would seek and capture, if possible, vessels like the Alabama, but Russell asked Lyons to find out “whether in any case they [privateers] will be authorized to interfere with neutral commerce, and if in any case in what case, and to what extent[987].”  Three days later, on March 26, Adams presented his instructions and these Russell regarded as “not unfriendly in tone,” but in the long conversation that ensued the old result was reached that Adams declared Great Britain negligent in performance of neutral duty, while Russell professed eagerness to stop Southern shipbuilding if full evidence was “forthcoming.”  Adams concluded that “he had worked to the best of his power for peace, but it had become a most difficult task.”  Upon this Russell commented to Lyons, “Mr. Adams fully deserves the character of having always laboured for peace between our two Nations.  Nor I trust will his efforts, and those of the two Governments fail of success[988].”

In these last days of March matters were in fact rapidly drawing to a head both in America and England.  At Washington, from March seventh to the thirty-first, the question of issuing letters of marque and reprisal had been prominently before the Cabinet and even Welles who had opposed them was affected by unfavourable reports received from Adams as to the intentions of Great Britain.  The final decision was to wait later news from England[989].  This was Seward’s idea as he had not as yet received reports of the British reaction to his communications through Lyons and Adams.  March 27 was the critical day of decision in London, as it was also the day upon which public and parliamentary opinion was most vigorously debated in regard to Great Britain’s neutral duty.  Preceding this other factors of influence were coming to the front.  In the first days of March, Slidell, at Paris, had received semi-official assurances that if the South wished to build ships in French yards “we should be permitted to arm and equip them and proceed to sea[990].”  This suggestion was permitted to percolate in England with the intention, no doubt, of strengthening Bullock’s position there.  In the winter of 1862-3, orders had been sent to the Russian Baltic fleet to cruise in western waters and there was first a suspicion in America, later a conviction, that the purpose of this cruise was distinctly friendly to the North—­that the orders might even extend to actual naval aid in case war should arise with England and France.  In March, 1863, this was but vague rumour, by midsummer it was a confident hope, by September-October, when Russian fleets had entered the harbours of New York