“I am receiving daily such representations from our sea-ports concerning the depredations on our commerce committed by the vessels built and practically fitted out in England, that I do most sincerely apprehend a new element is entering into the unhappy condition of affairs, which, with all the best dispositions of your Government and my own, cannot long be controlled to the preservation of peace.

“If you think well of it, I should like that you should confidentially inform Earl Russell that the departure of more armed vessels under insurgent-rebel command from English ports is a thing to be deprecated above all things.”

On March 9th, Lyons had a long talk with Seward about this, and it appears that Lincoln had seen the letter and approved it.  Seward stated that the New York Chamber of Commerce had protested about the Alabama, declaring: 

“That no American merchant vessels would get freights—­that even war with England was preferable to this—­that in that case the maritime enterprise of the country would at least find a profitable employment in cruising against British trade.”

Seward went on to show the necessity of letters of marque, and Lyons protested vigorously and implied that war must result.

“Mr. Seward said that he was well aware of the inconvenience not to say the danger of issuing Letters of Marque:  that he should be glad to delay doing so, or to escape the necessity altogether; but that really unless some intelligence came from England to allay the public exasperation, the measure would be unavoidable[984].”

Lyons was much alarmed, writing that the feeling in the North must not be underestimated and pointing out that the newspapers were dwelling on the notion that under British interpretation of her duty as a neutral Mexico, if she had money, could build ships in British ports to cruise in destruction of French commerce, adding that “one might almost suppose” some rich American would give the funds to Mexico for the purpose and so seek to involve England in trouble with France[985].  Lyons had also been told by Seward in their conversation of March 9, that on that day an instruction had been sent to Adams to present to Russell the delicacy of the situation and to ask for some assurance that no further Southern vessels of war should escape from British ports.  This instruction presented the situation in more diplomatic language but in no uncertain tone, yet still confined explanation of the privateering bill as required to prevent the “destruction of our national navigating interest, unless that calamity can be prevented by ... the enforcement of the neutrality law of Great Britain[986]....”