Coincidently, but as yet unknown in Washington, the chagrin of Russell at the escape of the Alabama had somewhat lost its edge.  At first he had been impressed with the necessity of amending the Foreign Enlistment Act so as to prevent similar offences and had gained the approval of the law officers of the Crown.  Russell had even offered to take up with America an agreement by which both countries were to amend their neutrality laws at the same moment.  This was in December, 1862, but now on February 14, 1863, he wrote to Lyons that the project of amendment had been abandoned as the Cabinet saw no way of improving the law[981].  While this letter to Lyons was on its way to America, a letter from Seward was en route, explaining to Adams the meaning of the privateering bill.

“The Senate has prepared a Bill which confers upon the President of the United States the power to grant letters of marque and reprisal in any war in which the country may at any time be engaged, and it is expected that the Bill will become a law.  Lord Lyons suggests that the transaction may possibly be misapprehended abroad, if it come upon foreign powers suddenly and without any explanations.  You will be at liberty to say that, as the Bill stands, the executive Government will be set at liberty to put the law in force in its discretion, and that thus far the proper policy in regard to the exercise of that discretion has not engaged the President’s attention.  I have had little hesitation in saying to Lord Lyons that if no extreme circumstances occur, there will be entire frankness on the part of the Government in communicating to him upon the subject, so far as to avoid any surprise on the part of friendly nations, whose commerce or navigation it might be feared would be incidentally and indirectly affected, if it shall be found expedient to put the Act in force against the insurgents of the United States[982].”

Certainly this was vague explanation, yet though the main object might be asserted “to put the act in force against the insurgents,” the hint was given that the commerce of friendly neutrals might be “incidentally and indirectly affected.”  And so both Lyons and Seward understood the matter, for on February 24, Lyons reported a long conversation with Seward in which after pointing out the probable “bad effect” on Europe, Lyons received the reply that some remedy must be found for the fact that “the law did not appear to enable the British Government to prevent” the issue of Confederate “privateers[983].”  On March 8, Seward followed this up by sending to Lyons an autograph letter: