prohibit official interference in the issue from British ports of a whole fleet of Southern war-vessels.  Russell might himself feel that a real offence to the North had taken place.  He might write, “I confess the proceedings of that vessel [the Alabama] are enough to rile a more temperate nation, and I owe a grudge to the Liverpool people on that account[974],” but this was of no value to the North if the governmental decision was against interference without complete and absolute proof.

It was therefore the concern of the North to find some means of bringing home to the British Ministry the enormity of the offence in American eyes and the serious danger to good relations if such offences were to be continued.  An immediate downright threat of war would have been impolitic and would have stirred British pride to the point of resentment.  Yet American pride was aroused also and it was required of Seward that he gain the Northern object and yet make no such threat as would involve the two nations in war—­a result that would have marked the success of Southern secession.  That Seward was able to find the way in which to do this is evidence of that fertility of imagination and gift in expedient which marked his whole career in the diplomacy of the Civil War[975].

In that same month when Adams was beginning his protests on the “290,” June, 1862, there had already been drawn the plans, and the contracts made with the Laird Brothers at Liverpool, for the building of two vessels far more dangerous than the Alabama to the Northern cause.  These were the so-called Laird Rams.  They were to be two hundred and thirty feet long, have a beam of forty feet, be armoured with four and one-half inch iron plate and be provided with a “piercer” at the prow, about seven feet long and of great strength.  This “piercer” caused the ships to be spoken of as rams, and when the vessels were fully equipped it was expected the “piercer” would be three feet under the surface of the water.  This was the distinguishing feature of the two ships; it was unusual construction, nearly impossible of use in an ordinary battle at sea, but highly dangerous to wooden ships maintaining a close blockade at some Southern port.  While there was much newspaper comment in England that the vessels were “new Alabamas,” and in America that they were “floating fortresses,” suitable for attack upon defenceless Northern cities, their primary purpose was to break up the blockading squadrons[976].

Shortly before the escape of the Alabama and at a time when there was but little hope the British Government would seize her and shortly after the news was received in Washington that still other vessels were planned for building in the Lairds’ yards, a Bill was introduced in Congress authorizing the President to issue letters of marque and privateering.  This was in July, 1862, and on the twelfth, Seward wrote to Adams of the proposed measure specifying