Meanwhile American anxiety as to a possible alteration in British neutral policy was increasing.  July 11, Adams reported that he had learned “from a credible source” that the British Cabinet might soon “take new ground[903].”  This despatch if it reached Seward previous to the Cabinet of July 22, presumably added strength to his conviction of the inadvisability of now issuing the proclamation.  In that Cabinet, Seward in fact went much beyond the customary historical statement that he advised postponement of the proclamation until the occurrence of a Northern victory; he argued, according to Secretary of War Stanton’s notes of the meeting, “That foreign nations will intervene to prevent the abolition of slavery for the sake of cotton....  We break up our relations with foreign nations and the production of cotton for sixty years[904].”  These views did not prevail; Lincoln merely postponed action.  Ten days later Seward sent that long instruction to Adams covering the whole ground of feared European intervention, which, fortunately, Adams was never called upon to carry out[905].  In it there was renewed the threat of a servile war if Europe attempted to aid the South, and again it is the materialistic view that is emphasized.  Seward was clinging to his theory of correct policy.

Nor was he mistaken in his view of first reactions in governmental circles abroad—­at least in England.  On July 21, the day before Lincoln’s proposal of emancipation in the Cabinet, Stuart in reviewing military prospects wrote:  “Amongst the means relied upon for weakening the South is included a servile war[906].”  To this Russell replied:  “...  I have to observe that the prospect of a servile war will only make other nations more desirous to see an end of this desolating and destructive conflict[907].”  This was but brief reiteration of a more exact statement by Russell made in comment on Seward’s first hint of servile war in his despatch to Adams of May 28, a copy of which had been given to Russell on June 20.  On July 28, Russell reviewing Seward’s arguments, commented on the fast increasing bitterness of the American conflict, disturbing and unsettling to European Governments, and wrote: 

“The approach of a servile war, so much insisted upon by Mr. Seward in his despatch, only forewarns us that another element of destruction may be added to the slaughter, loss of property, and waste of industry, which already afflict a country so lately prosperous and tranquil[908].”

In this same despatch unfavourable comment was made also on the Confiscation Bill with its punitive emancipation clauses.  Stuart presented a copy of the despatch to Seward on August 16[909].  On August 22, Stuart learned of Lincoln’s plan and reported it as purely a manoeuvre to affect home politics and to frighten foreign governments[910].  Where did Stuart get the news if not from Seward, since he also reported the latter’s success in postponing the proclamation?