Here seemed to be specific denial of raising a moral issue; yet unknown to the public at the moment there had already been drafted and discussed in Cabinet the emancipation proclamation.  Greeley had presented abolitionist demands essential to cement the North.  A month later, September 13, a delegation of Chicago clergymen came to Washington, had an audience with Lincoln, presented similar arguments, but also laid stress on the necessity of securing the sympathy of Europe.  This was but nine days before the first proclamation was issued, but Lincoln replied much as to Greeley, though he stated, “I will also concede that Emancipation would help us in Europe, and convince them that we are incited by something more than ambition[894].”  Immediately after the event, September 24, making a short speech to a serenading party, Lincoln said, “I can only trust in God I have made no mistake....  It is now for the country and the world to pass judgment and, maybe, take action upon it[895].”  Over a year later, December 8, 1863, in his annual message to Congress, he noted a “much improved” tone in foreign countries as resulting from the emancipation proclamation, but dwelt mainly on the beneficial effects at home[896].

Evidently there is slight ground for believing Lincoln to have been convinced that foreign relations would be improved by the proclamation.  On the contrary, if he trusted Seward’s judgment he may have feared the effect on Europe, for such was Seward’s prophecy.  Here may have lain the true meaning of Lincoln’s speech of September 24—­that it was now for “the world to pass judgment and, maybe, take action upon it.”  After all foreign policy, though its main lines were subject to the President’s control, was in the hands of Seward and throughout this entire period of six months since the introduction of the Confiscation Bill up to Lincoln’s presentation of his draft proclamation to the Cabinet in July, Seward had been using the threat of a servile insurrection as a deterrent upon French-British talk of intervention.  At times Seward connected servile insurrection with emancipation—­at times not.

Seward had begun his career as Secretary of State with an appeal to Europe on lines of old friendship and had implied, though he could not state explicitly, the “noble” cause of the North.  He had been met with what he considered a “cold” and premature as well as unjustifiable declaration of neutrality.  From the first day of the conflict Lyons and Mercier had been constant in representing the hardships inflicted by the American war upon the economic interests of their respective countries.  Both men bore down upon the interruption of the cotton trade and Seward kept repeating that Northern victories would soon release the raw cotton.  He expected and promised much from the capture of New Orleans, but the results were disappointing.  As time went on Seward became convinced that material interests alone would determine the attitude and action of Great