From February, 1862, until the issue of the first emancipation proclamation in September, there was, in truth, a genuine conflict between Congress and President as to methods and extent of emancipation.  Congress was in a mood to punish the South; Lincoln, looking steadily toward re-union, yet realizing the rising strength of anti-slavery in the North, advocated a gradual, voluntary, and compensated emancipation.  Neither party spoke the word “servile insurrection,” yet both realized its possibility, and Seward, in foreign affairs, was quick to see and use it as a threat.  A brief summary of measures will indicate the contest.  March 6, Lincoln sent a message to Congress recommending that a joint resolution be passed pledging the pecuniary aid of the national Government to any state voluntarily emancipating its slaves, his avowed purpose being to secure early action by the loyal border states in the hope that this might influence the Southern states[866].  Neither the House of Representatives nor the Senate were really favourable to this resolution and the border states bitterly opposed it in debate, but it passed by substantial majorities in both branches and was approved by Lincoln on April 10.  In effect the extreme radical element in Congress had yielded, momentarily, to the President’s insistence on an olive-branch offering of compensated emancipation.  Both as regards the border states and looking to the restoration of the Union, Lincoln was determined to give this line of policy a trial.  The prevailing sentiment of Congress, however, preferred the punitive Confiscation Bill.

At this juncture General Hunter, in command of the “Department of the South,” which theoretically included also the States of South Carolina, Georgia and Florida, issued an order declaring the slaves in these states free.  This was May 9, 1862.  Lincoln immediately countermanded Hunter’s order, stating that such action “under my responsibility, I reserve to myself[867].”  He renewed, in this same proclamation, earnest appeals to the border states, to embrace the opportunity offered by the Congressional resolution of April 10.  In truth, border state attitude was the test of the feasibility of Lincoln’s hoped-for voluntary emancipation, but these states were unwilling to accept the plan.  Meanwhile pressure was being exerted for action on the Confiscation Bill; it was pushed through Congress and presented to Lincoln for his signature or veto.  He signed it on July 12, but did not notify that fact to Congress until July 17. On this same day of signature, July 12, Lincoln sent to Congress a proposal of an Act to give pecuniary aid in voluntary state emancipation and held a conference with the congressional representatives of the border states seeking their definite approval of his policy.  A minority agreed but the majority were emphatically against him.  The Confiscation Bill would not affect the border states; they were not in rebellion.  And they did not desire to free the slaves even if compensated[868].