[Footnote 786:  Cited in Adams, A Crisis in Downing Street, p. 407.]

[Footnote 787:  Derby, in conversation with Clarendon, had characterized Gladstone’s speech as an offence against tradition and best practice.  Palmerston agreed, but added that the same objection could be made to Lewis’ speech.  Maxwell, Clarendon, II, 267.  Palmerston to Clarendon, Oct. 20, 1862.  Clarendon wrote Lewis, Oct. 24, that he did not think this called for any explanation by Lewis to Palmerston, further proof of the falsity of Palmerston’s initiative. Ibid., p. 267.]

[Footnote 788:  The Index, Oct. 16, 1862, warned against acceptance of Gladstone’s Newcastle utterances as indicating Government policy, asserted that the bulk of English opinion was with him, but ignorantly interpreted Cabinet hesitation to the “favour of the North and bitter enmity to the South, which has animated the diplomatic career of Lord Russell....”  Throughout the war, Russell, to The Index, was the evil genius of the Government.]

[Footnote 789:  Palmerston MS.]

[Footnote 790:  Maxwell, Clarendon, II, 279.]

[Footnote 791:  Palmerston MS.]

[Footnote 792:  Parliamentary Papers, 1863. Commons, Vol.  I XII.  “Correspondence relating to the Civil War in the United States of North America.”  Nos. 33 and 37.  Two reports received Oct. 13 and 18, 1862.  Anderson’s mission was to report on the alleged drafting of British subjects into the Northern Army.]

[Footnote 793:  Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. 18, 1862.]

[Footnote 794:  Russell Papers.  Clarendon to Russell, Oct. 19, 1862.]

[Footnote 795:  Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. 20, 1862.]

[Footnote 796:  Russell Papers.  It is significant that Palmerston’s organ, the Morning Post, after a long silence came out on Oct. 21 with a sharp attack on Gladstone for his presumption.  Lewis was also reflected upon, but less severely.]

[Footnote 797:  Maxwell, Clarendon, II, 265.]

[Footnote 798:  U.S.  Messages and Documents, 1862-3, Pt.  I, p. 223.  Adams to Seward, Oct. 24, 1862.  C. F. Adams in A Crisis in Downing Street, p. 417, makes Russell state that the Government’s intention was “to adhere to the rule of perfect neutrality”—­seemingly a more positive assurance, and so understood by the American Minister.]

[Footnote 799:  The Index, Oct. 23, 1862. “... while our people are starving, our commerce interrupted, our industry paralysed, our Ministry have no plan, no idea, no intention to do anything but fold their hands, talk of strict neutrality, spare the excited feelings of the North, and wait, like Mr. Micawber, for something to turn up.”]

[Footnote 800:  Russell Papers.  To Russell.]

[Footnote 801:  Ibid., To Russell, Oct. 24, 1862.]

[Footnote 802:  Palmerston MS. Russell to Palmerston, Oct. 24, 1862.]