For America Russell’s mediation plan constitutes the most dangerous crisis in the war for the restoration of the Union.  Had that plan been adopted, no matter how friendly in intent, there is little question that Lewis’ forebodings would have been realized and war would have ensued between England and the North.  But also whatever its results in other respects the independence of the South would have been established.  Slavery, hated of Great Britain, would have received a new lease of life—­and by British action.  In the Cabinet argument all parties agreed that Lincoln’s emancipation proclamation was but an incitement to servile war and it played no part in the final decision.  Soon that proclamation was to erect a positive barrier of public opinion against any future efforts to secure British intervention.  Never again was there serious governmental consideration of meddling in the American Civil War[845].

FOOTNOTES: 

[Footnote 734:  Motley, Correspondence, II, 71.  To his mother, March 16, 1862.]

[Footnote 735:  Ibid., p. 81.  Aug. 18, 1862.]

[Footnote 736:  The Index first appeared on May 1, 1862.  Nominally a purely British weekly it was soon recognized as the mouthpiece of the Confederacy.]

[Footnote 737:  The Index, May 15, 29, June 19 and July 31, 1862.]

[Footnote 738:  e.g., the issue of Aug. 14, 1862, contained a long report of a banquet in Sheffield attended by Palmerston and Roebuck.  In his speech Roebuck asserted:  “A divided America will be a benefit to England.”  He appealed to Palmerston to consider whether the time had not come to recognize the South.  “The North will never be our friends.  (Cheers.) Of the South you can make friends.  They are Englishmen; they are not the scum and refuse of Europe. (The Mayor of Manchester:  ’Don’t say that; don’t say that.’) (Cheers and disapprobation.) I know what I am saying.  They are Englishmen, and we must make them our friends.”]

[Footnote 739:  All American histories treat this incident at much length.  The historian who has most thoroughly discussed it is C.F.  Adams, with changing interpretation as new facts came to light.  See his Life of C.F.  Adams, Ch.  XV; Studies, Military and Diplomatic, pp. 400-412; Trans-Atlantic Historical Solidarity, pp. 97-106; A Crisis in Downing Street, Mass.  Hist.  Soc. Proceedings, May, 1914, pp. 372-424.  It will be made clear in a later chapter why Roebuck’s motion of midsummer, 1863, was unimportant in considering Ministerial policy.]

[Footnote 740:  Adams, A Crisis in Downing Street, p. 388.]

[Footnote 741:  U.S.  Messages and Documents, 1862-3.  Pt.  I, pp. 165-168.]

[Footnote 742:  Adams, A Crisis in Downing Street, p. 389.  First printed in Rhodes, VI, pp. 342-3, in 1899.]

[Footnote 743:  Ibid., p. 390.]