In general, as the weeks passed, the satisfaction grew both with the public and in the Government that England had made no adventure of new policy towards America.  This satisfaction was strongly reinforced when the first reports were received from Lyons on his arrival in America.  Reaching New York on November 8 he found that even the “Conservatives” were much opposed to an offer of mediation at present and thought it would only do harm until there was a change of Government in Washington—­an event still remote.  Lyons himself believed mediation useless unless intended to be followed by recognition of the South and that such recognition was likewise of no value without a raising of the blockade for which he thought the British Cabinet not prepared[837].  Lyons flatly contradicted Stuart’s reports, his cool judgment of conditions nowhere more clearly manifested than at this juncture in comparison with his subordinate’s excited and eager pro-Southern arguments.  Again on November 28 Lyons wrote that he could not find a single Northern paper that did not repudiate foreign intervention[838].  In the South, when it was learned that France had offered to act and England had refused, there was an outburst of bitter anti-British feeling[839].

The Northern press, as Lyons had reported, was unanimous in rejection of European offers of aid, however friendly, in settling the war.  It expressed no gratitude to England, devoting its energy rather to animadversions on Napoleon III who was held to be personally responsible.  Since there had been no European offer made there was no cause for governmental action.  Seward had given Adams specific instructions in case the emergency arose but there had been no reason to present these or to act upon them and the crisis once past Seward believed all danger of European meddling was over and permanently.  He wrote to Bigelow:  “We are no longer to be disturbed by Secession intrigues in Europe.  They have had their day.  We propose to forget them[840].”  This was a wise and statesmanlike attitude and was shared by Adams in London.  Whatever either man knew or guessed of the prelude to the answer to France, November 13, they were careful to accept that answer as fulfilment of Russell’s declaration to Adams, October 23, that Great Britain intended no change of policy[841].

So far removed was Seward’s attitude toward England from that ascribed to him in 1861, so calm was his treatment of questions now up for immediate consideration, so friendly was he personally toward Lyons, that the British Minister became greatly alarmed when, shortly after his return to Washington, there developed a Cabinet controversy threatening the retirement of the Secretary of State.  This was a quarrel brought on by the personal sensibilities of Chase, Secretary of the Treasury, and directed at Seward’s conduct of foreign affairs.  It was quieted by the tact and authority of Lincoln, who, when Seward handed in his resignation, secured from Chase a similar