but the British public must expect no lasting change of Northern attitude toward England and must be ready for a war if the North were victorious[828]. Blackwood’s for November, 1862, strongly censured the Government for its failure to act.  The Edinburgh for January, 1863, as strongly supported the Ministry and expanded on the fixed determination of Great Britain to keep out of the war. The Index naturally frothed in angry disappointment, continuing its attacks, as if in hopes of a reversal of Ministerial decision, even into the next year.  “Has it come to this?  Is England, or the English Cabinet, afraid of the Northern States?  Lord Russell might contrive so to choose his excuses as not to insult at once both his country and her ally[829].”  An editorial from the Richmond (Virginia) Whig was quoted with approval characterizing Russell and Palmerston as “two old painted mummies,” who secretly were rejoiced at the war in America as “threatening the complete annihilation” of both sides, and expressing the conviction that if the old Union were restored both North and South would eagerly turn on Great Britain[830].  The explanation, said The Index, of British supineness was simply the pusillanimous fear of war—­and of a war that would not take place in spite of the bluster of Lincoln’s “hangers-on[831].”  Even as late as May of the year following, this explanation was still harped upon and Russell “a statesman” who belonged “rather to the past than to the present” was primarily responsible for British inaction.  “The nominal conduct of Foreign Affairs is in the hands of a diplomatic Malaprop, who has never shown vigour, activity, or determination, except where the display of these qualities was singularly unneeded, or even worse than useless[832].”

The Index never wavered from its assumption that in the Cabinet Russell was the chief enemy of the South.  Slidell, better informed, wrote:  “Who would have believed that Earl Russell would have been the only member of the Cabinet besides Gladstone in favour of accepting the Emperor’s proposition[833]?” He had information that Napoleon had been led to expect his proposal would be accepted and was much irritated—­so much so that France would now probably act alone[834].  Gladstone’s attitude was a sorrow to many of his friends.  Bright believed he was at last weaned from desires for mediation and sympathetic with the answer to France[835], but Goldwin Smith in correspondence with Gladstone on American affairs knew that the wild idea now in the statesman’s mind was of offering Canada to the North if she would let the South go[836]—­a plan unknown, fortunately for Gladstone’s reputation for good judgment, save to his correspondent.