been discussed, the Chancellor uttered a few oracular sentences on the danger of refusing the French invitation, and gave a strong support to Lord John.  His support came rather late ...  I proposed that we should tater le terrain at Washington and ascertain whether there was any chance of the proposal being accepted.  Lord John refused this.  He admitted there was no chance of an affirmative answer from Washington.  I think his principal motive was a fear of displeasing France, and that Palmerston’s principal motive was a wish to seem to support him.  There is a useful article in to-day’s Times throwing cold water on the invitation.  I take for granted that Delane was informed of the result of the Cabinet[820].”

Gladstone, writing to his wife, gave a similar though more brief account: 

“Nov. 11.  We have had our Cabinet to-day and meet again to-morrow.  I am afraid we shall do little or nothing in the business of America.  But I will send you definite intelligence.  Both Lords Palmerston and Russell are right. Nov. 12.  The United States affair has ended and not well.  Lord Russell rather turned tail.  He gave way without resolutely fighting out his battle.  However, though we decline for the moment, the answer is put upon grounds and in terms which leave the matter very open for the future.  Nov. 13.  I think the French will make our answer about America public; at least it is very possible.  But I hope they may not take it as a positive refusal, or at any rate that they may themselves act in the matter.  It will be clear that we concur with them, that the war should cease.  Palmerston gave to Russell’s proposal a feeble and half-hearted support[821].”

The reply to France was in fact immediately made public both in France and in England.  It was complimentary to the Emperor’s “benevolent views and humane intentions,” agreed that “if the steps proposed were to be taken, the concurrence of Russia would be extremely desirable” but remarked that as yet Great Britain had not been informed that Russia wished to co-operate, and concluded that since there was no ground to hope the North was ready for the proposal it seemed best to postpone any overture until there was a “greater prospect than now exists of its being accepted by the two contending parties[822].”  The argument of Russell in the Cabinet had been for acceptance without Russia though earlier he had stipulated her assistance as essential.  This was due to the knowledge already at hand through a telegram from Napier at St. Petersburg, November 8, that Russia would refuse[823].  But in the answer to France it is the attitude of Russia that becomes an important reason for British refusal as, indeed, it was the basis for harmonious decision within the British Cabinet.  This is not to say that had Russia acceded England also would have done so, for the weight of Cabinet opinion, adroitly encouraged by Palmerston, was against Russell and the result reached was that which the Premier wished.  More important in his view than any other matter was the preservation of a united Ministry and at the conclusion of the American debate even Gladstone could write:  “As to the state of matters generally in the Cabinet, I have never seen it smoother[824].”