Here was vigorous resistance to Russell, especially effective for its appeal to past British policy, and to correct practice in international law.  On the same day that Lewis’ memorandum was circulated, there appeared a communication in the Times by “Historicus,” on “The International Doctrine of Recognition,” outlining in briefer form exactly those international law arguments presented by Lewis, and advocating a continuation of the policy of strict neutrality.  “Historicus” was William Vernon Harcourt, husband of Lewis’ stepdaughter who was also the niece of Clarendon.  Evidently the family guns were all trained on Russell[816].  “Historicus” drove home the fact that premature action by a neutral was a “hostile act” and ought to be resented by the “Sovereign State” as a “breach of neutrality and friendship[817].”

Thus on receipt of the news of Napoleon’s proposal the Cabinet crisis was renewed and even more sharply than on October 23.  The French offer was not actually presented until November 10[818].  On the next two days the answer to be made received long discussion in the Cabinet.  Lewis described this to Clarendon, prefacing his account by stating that Russell had heard by telegram from Napier at St. Petersburg to the effect that Russia would not join but would support English-French proposals through her Minister at Washington, “provided it would not cause irritation[819].”

“Having made this statement, Lord John proceeded to explain his views on the question.  These were, briefly, that the recent successes of the Democrats afforded a most favourable opportunity of intervention, because we should strengthen their hands, and that if we refused the invitation of France, Russia would reconsider her decision, act directly with France, and thus accomplish her favourite purpose of separating France and England.  He therefore advised that the proposal of France should be accepted.  Palmerston followed Lord John, and supported him, but did not say a great deal.  His principal argument was the necessity for showing sympathy with Lancashire, and of not throwing away any chance of mitigating it [sic].

“The proposal was now thrown before the Cabinet, who proceeded to pick it to pieces.  Everybody present threw a stone at it of greater or less size, except Gladstone, who supported it, and the Chancellor [Westbury] and Cardwell, who expressed no opinion.  The principal objection was that the proposed armistice of six months by sea and land, involving a suspension of the commercial blockade, was so grossly unequal—­so decidedly in favour of the South, that there was no chance of the North agreeing to it.  After a time, Palmerston saw that the general feeling of the Cabinet was against being a party to the representation, and he capitulated.  I do not think his support was very sincere:  it certainly was not hearty ...  I ought to add that, after the Cabinet had come to a decision and the outline of a draft had