examine, first, whether there are any terms upon which North and South would consent to restore the Union; and secondly, failing any such terms, whether there are any terms upon which both would consent to separate.

“We should also say that if the Union is to be restored it would be essential in our view, that after what has taken place all the slaves should be emancipated, compensation being granted by Congress at the rate at which Great Britain emancipated her slaves in 1833.

     “If separation takes place we must be silent on the trend of
     slavery, as we are with regard to Spain and Brazil.

     “This is a rough sketch, but I will expand it for the
     Cabinet.

     “It will be an honourable proposal to make, but the North and
     probably the South will refuse it[814].”

Here were several ideas quite impossible of acceptance by North and South in their then frame of mind and Russell himself believed them certain to be refused by the North in any case.  But he was eager to present the question for Cabinet discussion hoping for a reversal of the previous decision.  Whether from pique or from conviction of the wisdom of a change in British policy, he proposed to press for acceptance of the French plan, with modifications.  The news of Napoleon’s offer and of Russell’s attitude, with some uncertainty as to that of Palmerston, again brought Lewis into action and on November 7 he circulated another memorandum, this time a very long one of some fifteen thousand words.  This was in the main an historical resume of past British policy in relation to revolted peoples, stating the international law of such cases, and pointing out that Great Britain had never recognized a revolted people so long as a bona fide struggle was still going on.  Peace was no doubt greatly to be desired.  “If England could, by legitimate means, and without unduly sacrificing or imperilling her own interests, accelerate this consummation, she would, in my opinion, earn the just gratitude of the civilized world.”  But the question, as he had previously asserted, was full of grave dangers.  The very suggestion of a concert of Powers was itself one to be avoided.  “A conference of the five great Powers is an imposing force, but it is a dangerous body to set in motion.  A single intervening Power may possibly contrive to satisfy both the adverse parties; but five intervening Powers have first to satisfy one another.”  Who could tell what divergence might arise on the question of slavery, or on boundaries, or how far England might find her ideals or her vital interests compromised[815]?