to the Yankee slap we should receive, or in being asked what practical solution we had to propose after an armistice had been agreed to at our suggestion, that no discussion on the subject would have been possible, and the Foreign Secretary probably thought it would be pleasanter to draw in his horns at Woburn than in Downing Street[805].”

On October 26, having received from Lewis a copy of Russell’s newly-circulated paper, Clarendon wrote again: 

“The Foreign Secretary’s blatt exhibits considerable soreness, for which you are specially bound to make allowance, as it was you who procured abortion for him.  He had thought to make a great deal of his colt by Meddler out of Vanity, and you have shown his backers that the animal was not fit to start and would not run a yard if he did.  He is therefore taken back to the country, where he must have a deal more training before he can appear in public again.”

* * * * *

“I should say that your speech at Hereford was nearly as effective in checking the alarm and speculation caused by Gladstone’s speech, as your memorandum was in smashing the Foreign Secretary’s proposed intervention, and that you did so without in the smallest degree committing either the Government or yourself with respect to the future[806].”

In effect Clarendon was advising Lewis to pay no attention to Russell’s complaining rejoinder since the object desired had been secured, but there was still one element of strength for Russell and Gladstone which, if obtained, might easily cause a re-opening of the whole question.  This was the desire of France, still unexpressed in spite of indirect overtures, a silence in part responsible for the expression of an opinion by Palmerston that Napoleon’s words could not be depended upon as an indication of what he intended to do[807].  On the day this was written the French ministerial crisis—­the real cause of Napoleon’s silence—­came to an end with the retirement of Thouvenel and the succession of Drouyn de Lhuys.  Russell’s reply to Palmerston’s assertion of the folly of appealing now to the belligerents was that “recognition” was certainly out of the question for the present and that “it should not take place till May Or June next year, when circumstances may show pretty clearly whether Gladstone was right[808].”  But this yielding to the Premier’s decision was quickly withdrawn when, at last, Napoleon and his new Minister could turn their attention to the American question.

On October 27 Cowley reported a conversation with the Emperor in which American affairs were discussed.  Napoleon hoped that England, France and Russia would join in an offer of mediation.  Cowley replied that he had no instructions and Napoleon then modified his ideas by suggesting a proposal of armistice for six months “in order to give time for the present excitement to calm down[809]....”  The next