Lewis did not in any sense pose as a friend of the North.  Rather he treated the whole matter, in his speech at Hereford and later in the Cabinet as one requiring cool judgment and decision on the sole ground of British interests.  This was the line best suited to sustain his arguments, but does not prove, as some have thought, that his Cabinet acknowledgment of the impossibility of Northern complete victory, was his private conviction[785].  At Hereford Lewis argued that everyone must acknowledge a great war was in progress and must admit it “to be undecided.  Under such circumstances, the time had not yet arrived when it could be asserted in accordance with the established doctrines of international law that the independence of the Southern States had been established[786].”  In effect Lewis gave public notice that no Cabinet decision had yet been reached, a step equally opposed to Cabinet traditions with Gladstone’s speech, since equally unauthorized, but excusable in the view that the first offence against tradition had forced a rejoinder[787].  For the public Lewis accomplished his purpose and the press refrained from comment, awaiting results[788].  Meanwhile Palmerston, who must finally determine policy, was remaining in uncertainty and in this situation thought it wise to consult, indirectly, Derby, the leader of the opposition in Parliament.  This was done through Clarendon, who wrote to Palmerston on October 16 that Derby was averse to action.

“He said that he had been constantly urged to go in for recognition and mediation, but had always refused on the ground that recognition would merely irritate the North without advancing the cause of the South or procuring a single bale of cotton, and that mediation in the present temper of the Belligerents must be rejected even if the mediating Powers themselves knew what to propose as a fair basis of compromise; for as each party insisted upon having that which the other declared was vitally essential to its existence, it was clear that the war had not yet marked out the stipulations of a treaty of peace....  The recognition of the South could be of no benefit to England unless we meant to sweep away the blockade, which would be an act of hostility towards the North[789].”

More than any other member of the Cabinet Lewis was able to guess, fairly accurately, what was in the Premier’s mind for Lewis was Clarendon’s brother-in-law, and “the most intimate and esteemed of his male friends[790].”  They were in constant communication as the Cabinet crisis developed, and Lewis’ next step was taken immediately after Palmerston’s consultation of Derby through Clarendon.  October 17, Lewis circulated a memorandum in reply to that of Russell’s of October 13.  He agreed with Russell’s statement of the facts of the situation in America, but added with sarcasm: