The speculative market, sensitive barometer of governmental policy, immediately underwent such violent fluctuations as to indicate a general belief that Gladstone’s speech meant action in the war.  The price of raw cotton dropped so abruptly as to alarm Southern friends and cause them to give assurances that even if the blockade were broken there would be no immediate outpouring of cotton from Southern ports[779].  On the other hand, Bright, staunch friend of the North, hoped that Gladstone was merely seeking to overcome a half-hearted reluctance of Palmerston and Russell to move.  He was sore at heart over the “vile speech” of “your old acquaintance and friend[780].”  The leading newspapers while at first accepting the Newcastle speech as an authoritative statement and generally, though mildly, approving, were quick to feel that there was still uncertainty of policy and became silent until it should be made clear just what was in the wind[781].  Within the Cabinet it is to be supposed that Gladstone had caused no small stir, both by reason of his unusual procedure and by his sentiments.  On Russell, however much disliked was the incursion into his own province, the effect was reinvigoration of a desire to carry through at least some portion of the plan and he determined to go on with the proposal of an armistice.  Six days after Gladstone’s speech Russell circulated, October 13, a memorandum on America[782].

This memorandum asserted that the South had shown, conclusively, its power to resist—­had maintained a successful defensive; that the notion of a strong pro-Northern element in the South had been shown to be wholly delusive; that the emancipation proclamation, promising a freeing of the slaves in the sections still in rebellion on January 1, 1863, was no humanitarian or idealistic measure (since it left slavery in the loyal or recognized districts) and was but an incitement to servile war—­a most “terrible” plan.  For these reasons Russell urged that the Great Powers ought seriously to consider whether it was not their duty to propose a “suspension of arms” for the purpose of “weighing calmly the advantages of peace[783].”  This was a far cry from mediation and recognition, nor did Russell indicate either the proposed terms of an armistice or the exact steps to be taken by Europe in bringing it about and making it of value.  But the memorandum of October 13 does clearly negative what has been the accepted British political tradition which is to the effect that Palmerston, angered at Gladstone’s presumption and now determined against action, had “put up” Cornewall Lewis to reply in a public speech, thereby permitting public information that no Cabinet decision had as yet been reached.  Lewis’ speech was made at Hereford on October 14.  Such were the relations between Palmerston and Russell that it is impossible the former would have so used Lewis without notifying Russell, in which case there would have been no Foreign Office memorandum of the thirteenth[784].  Lewis was, in fact, vigorously maintaining his objections, already made known to Russell, to any plan of departure from the hitherto accepted policy of neutrality and his speech at Hereford was the opening gun of active opposition.