(i) That we propose separation,

     (ii) That we shall take no part in the war unless attacked
     ourselves[775].”

How Russell proposed to evade a war with an angry North was not made clear, but in this same letter notice was given that he was preparing a memorandum for the Cabinet.  Russell was still for a mediation on lines of separation, but his uncertainty, even confusion, of mind became evident but another two days later on receipt of a letter from Stuart, written September 23, in which he and Mercier were now all for a suggestion of armistice, with no mention of separation[776].  Russell now thought: 

“If no fresh battles occur, I think the suggestion might be adopted, tho’ I am far from thinking with Mercier that the North would accept it.  But it would be a fair and defensible course, leaving it open to us to hasten or defer recognition if the proposal is declined.  Lord Lyons might carry it over on the 25th[777].”

British policy, as represented by the inclinations of the Foreign Secretary, having started out on a course portending positive and vigorous action, was now evidently in danger of veering far to one side, if not turning completely about.  But the day after Russell seemed to be considering such an attenuation of the earlier plan as to be content with a mere suggestion of armistice, a bomb was thrown into the already troubled waters further and violently disturbing them.  This was Gladstone’s speech at Newcastle, October 7, a good third of which was devoted to the Civil War and in which he asserted that Jefferson Davis had made an army, was making a navy, and had created something still greater—­a nation[778].  The chronology of shifts in opinion would, at first glance, indicate that Gladstone made this speech with the intention of forcing Palmerston and Russell to continue in the line earlier adopted, thus hoping to bolster up a cause now losing ground.  His declaration, coming from a leading member of of the Cabinet, was certain to be accepted by the public as a foreshadowing of governmental action.  If Jefferson Davis had in truth created a nation then early recognition must be given it.  But this surmise of intentional pressure is not borne out by any discovered evidence.  On the contrary, the truth is, seemingly, that Gladstone, in the north and out of touch, was in complete ignorance that the two weeks elapsed since his letters from Palmerston and Russell had produced any alteration of plan or even any hesitation.  Himself long convinced of the wisdom of British intervention in some form Gladstone evidently could not resist the temptation to make the good news known.  His declaration, foreshadowing a policy that did not pertain to his own department, and, more especially, that had not yet received Cabinet approval was in itself an offence against the traditions of British Cabinet organization.  He had spoken without authorization and “off his own bat.”