PALMERSTON[768].”

Very evidently Palmerston was experiencing doubts and was all in favour of cautious delay.  American military events more than Granville’s arguments influenced him, but almost immediately there appeared a much more vigorous and determined opponent within the Cabinet.  Cornewall Lewis was prompt to express objections.  October 2, Russell transmitted to Palmerston a letter of disapproval from Lewis.  Russell also, momentarily, was hesitating.  He wrote: 

     “This American question must be well sifted.  I send you a
     letter of G. Lewis who is against moving ...”

“My only doubt is whether we and France should stir if Russia holds back.  Her separation from our move would ensure the rejection of our proposals.  But we shall know more by the 16th.  I have desired a cabinet to be summoned for that day, but the summons will not go out till Saturday.  So if you wish to stop it, write to Hammond[769].”

From this it would appear that Russia had been approached[770] but that Russell’s chief concern was the attitude of France, that his proposed private communication to Cowley had been despatched and that he was waiting an answer which might be expected before the sixteenth.  If so his expectations were negatived by that crisis now on in the French Ministry over the Italian question prohibiting consideration of any other matter.  On October 15 Thouvenel was dismissed, but his formal retirement from office did not take place until October 24.  Several Ministers abroad, among them Flahault, at London, followed him into retirement and foreign affairs were temporarily in confusion[771].  The Emperor was away from Paris and all that Cowley reported was that the last time he had seen Thouvenel the latter had merely remarked that “as soon as the Emperor came back the two Governments ought to enter into a serious consideration of the whole question[772]....”  Cowley himself was more concerned that it was now becoming clear France, in spite of previous protestations, was planning “colonizing” Mexico[773].

Up to the end of September, therefore, the British Government, while wholly confident that France would agree in any effort whatsoever that England might wish to make, had no recent assurances, either official or private, to this effect.  This did not disturb Russell, who took for granted French approval, and soon he cast aside the hesitation caused by the doubts of Granville, the opposition of Lewis, and the caution of Palmerston.  Public opinion was certainly turning toward a demand for Ministerial action[774].  Two days of further consideration caused him to return to the attack; October 4 he wrote Palmerston: 

     “I think unless some miracle takes place this will be the
     very time for offering mediation, or as you suggest,
     proposing to North and South to come to terms.

     “Two things however must be made clear: