“MY DEAR RUSSELL,

“I return you Granville’s letter which contains much deserving of serious consideration.  There is no doubt that the offer of Mediation upon the basis of Separation would be accepted by the South.  Why should it not be accepted?  It would give the South in principle the points for which they are fighting.  The refusal, if refusal there was, would come from the North, who would be unwilling to give up the principle for which they have been fighting so long as they had a reasonable expectation that by going on fighting they could carry their point.  The condition of things therefore which would be favourable to an offer of mediation would be great success of the South against the North.  That state of things seemed ten days ago to be approaching.  Its advance has been lately checked, but we do not yet know the real course of recent events, and still less can we foresee what is about to follow.  Ten days or a fortnight more may throw a clearer light upon future prospects.

“As regards possible resentment on the part of the Northerns following upon an acknowledgment of the Independence of the South, it is quite true that we should have less to care about that resentment in the spring when communication with Canada was open, and when our naval force could more easily operate upon the American coast, than in winter when we are cut off from Canada and the American coast is not so safe.

“But if the acknowledgment were made at one and the same time by England, France and some other Powers, the Yankees would probably not seek a quarrel with us alone, and would not like one against a European Confederation.  Such a quarrel would render certain and permanent that Southern Independence the acknowledgment of which would have caused it.

“The first communication to be made by England and France to the contending parties might be, not an absolute offer of mediation but a friendly suggestion whether the time was not come when it might be well for the two parties to consider whether the war, however long continued, could lead to any other result than separation; and whether it might not therefore be best to avoid the great evils which must necessarily flow from a prolongation of hostilities by at once coming to an agreement to treat upon that principle of separation which must apparently be the inevitable result of the contest, however long it may last.

“The best thing would be that the two parties should settle details by direct negotiation with each other, though perhaps with the rancorous hatred now existing between them this might be difficult.  But their quarrels in negotiation would do us no harm if they did not lead to a renewal of war.  An armistice, if not accompanied by a cessation of blockades, would be all in favour of the North, especially if New Orleans remained in the hands of the North.

     “The whole matter is full of difficulty, and can only be
     cleared up by some more decided events between the contending
     armies....”