“The Federals ... got a very complete smashing ... even
     Washington or Baltimore may fall into the hands of the
     Confederates.”

“If this should happen, would it not be time for us to consider whether in such a state of things England and France might not address the contending parties and recommend an arrangement upon the basis of separation[754]?”

Russell replied: 

“...  I agree with you that the time is come for offering mediation to the United States Government, with a view to the recognition of the independence of the Confederates.  I agree further that, in case of failure, we ought ourselves to recognize the Southern States as an independent State.  For the purpose of taking so important a step, I think we must have a meeting, of the Cabinet.  The 23rd or 30th would suit me for the meeting[755].”

The two elder statesmen being in such complete accord the result of the unofficial overture to France was now awaited with interest.  This, considering the similar unofficial suggestions previously made by Napoleon, was surprisingly lukewarm.  Cowley reported that he had held a long and serious conversation with Thouvenel on the subject of mediation as instructed by Russell on the thirteenth and found a disposition “to wait to see the result of the elections” in the North.  Mercier apparently had been writing that Southern successes would strengthen the Northern peace party.  Thouvenel’s idea was that “if the peace party gains the ascendant,” Lincoln and Seward, both of whom were too far committed to listen to foreign suggestions, would “probably be set aside.”  He also emphasized the “serious consequences” England and France might expect if they recognized the South.

“I said that we might propose an armistice without mediation, and that if the other Powers joined with us in doing so, and let it be seen that a refusal would be followed by the recognition of the Southern States, the certainty of such recognition by all Europe must carry weight with it.”

     Thouvenel saw some difficulties, especially Russia.

     “...the French Government had some time back sounded that of
     Russia as to her joining France and England in an offer of
     mediation and had been met by an almost scornful refusal....”

     “It appears also that there is less public pressure here for
     the recognition of the South than there is in England[756].”

Thouvenel’s lack of enthusiasm might have operated as a check to Russell had he not been aware of two circumstances causing less weight than formerly to be attached to the opinions of the French Secretary for Foreign Affairs.  The first was the well-known difference on American policy between Thouvenel and Napoleon III and the well-grounded conviction that the Emperor was at any moment ready to impose his will, if only England would give the signal.  The second