This serious and definite determination by the North to resent any intervention by Europe makes evident that Seward and Lincoln were fully committed to forcible resistance of foreign meddling.  Briefly, if the need arose, the North would go to war with Europe.  Adams at least now knew where he stood and could but await the result.  The instruction he held in reserve, nor was it ever officially communicated to Russell.  He did, however, state its tenor to Forster who had contacts with the Cabinet through Milner-Gibson and though no proof has been found that the American determination was communicated to the Ministry, the presumption is that this occurred[743].  Such communication could not have taken place before the end of August and possibly was not then made owing to the fact that the Cabinet was scattered in the long vacation and that, apparently, the plan to move soon in the American War was as yet unknown save to Palmerston and to Russell.

Russell’s letter to Palmerston of August 6, sets the date of their determination[744].  Meanwhile they were depending much upon advices from Washington for the exact moment.  Stuart was suggesting, with Mercier, that October should be selected[745], and continued his urgings even though his immediate chief, Lyons, was writing to him from London strong personal objections to any European intervention whatever and especially any by Great Britain[746].  Lyons explained his objections to Russell as well, but Stuart, having gone to the extent of consulting also with Stoeckl, the Russian Minister at Washington, was now in favour of straight-out recognition of the Confederacy as the better measure.  This, thought Stoeckl, was less likely to bring on war with the North than an attempt at mediation[747].  Soon Stuart was able to give notice, a full month in advance of the event, of Lincoln’s plan to issue an emancipation proclamation, postponed temporarily on the insistence of Seward[748], but he attached no importance to this, regarding it as at best a measure of pretence intended to frighten the South and to influence foreign governments[749].  Russell was not impressed with Stuart’s shift from mediation to recognition.  “I think,” he wrote, “we must allow the President to spend his second batch of 600,000 men before we can hope that he and his democracy will listen to reason[750].”  But this did not imply that Russell was wavering in the idea that October would be a “ripe time.”  Soon he was journeying to the Continent in attendance on the Queen and using his leisure to perfect his great plan[751].

Russell’s first positive step was taken on September 13.  On that date he wrote to Cowley in Paris instructing him to sound Thouvenel, privately[752], and the day following he wrote to Palmerston commenting on the news just received of the exploits of Stonewall Jackson in Virginia, “it really looks as if he might end the war.  In October the hour will be ripe for the Cabinet[753].”  Similar reactions were expressed by Palmerston at the same moment and for the same reasons.  Palmerston also wrote on September 14: