It was not then cotton, primarily, which brought a revival in July of the Southern attack on the Government through Parliament[695].  June had seen the collapse of Lindsay’s initial move, and Palmerston’s answer to Hopwood, June 13, that there was no intention, at present, to offer mediation, appeared final.  It was not cotton, but McClellan’s defeat, that produced a quick renewal of Lindsay’s activities.  June 30, Hopwood had withdrawn his motion favouring recognition but in doing so asked whether, “considering the great and increasing distress in the country, the patient manner in which it has hitherto been borne, and the hopelessness of the termination of hostilities, the Government intend to take any steps whatever, either as parties to intervention or otherwise, to endeavour to put an end to the Civil War in America?” This was differently worded, yet contained little variation from his former question of June 13, and this time Palmerston replied briefly that the Government certainly would like to mediate if it saw any hope of success but that at present “both parties would probably reject it.  If a different situation should arise the Government would be glad to act[696].”  This admission was now seized upon by Lindsay who, on July 11, introduced a motion demanding consideration of “the propriety of offering mediation with the view of terminating hostilities,” and insisted upon a debate.

Thus while the first week of June seemed to have quieted rumours of British mediation, the end of the month saw them revived.  Adams was keenly aware of the changing temper of opinion and on June 20 presented to Russell a strong representation by Seward who wrote “under the President’s instructions” that such recurrent rumours were highly injurious to the North since upon hopes of foreign aid the South has been encouraged and sustained from the first day of secession.  Having developed this complaint at some length Seward went on to a brief threat, containing the real meat of the despatch, that if foreign nations did venture to intervene or mediate in favour of the South, the North would be forced to have recourse to a weapon hitherto not used, namely to aid in a rising of the slaves against their masters.  This was clearly a threat of a “servile war” if Great Britain aided the South—­a war which would place Britain in a very uncomfortable position in view of her anti-slavery sentiments in the past.  It is evidence of Adams’ discretion that this despatch, written May 28, was held back from presentation to Russell until revived rumours of mediation made the American Minister anxious[697].  No answer was given by Russell for over a month, a fact in itself indicative of some hesitancy on policy.  Soon the indirect diplomacy of Napoleon III was renewed in the hope of British concurrence.  July 11, Slidell informed Mason that Persigny in conversation had assured him “that this Government is now more anxious than ever to take prompt and decided action in our favour.”  Slidell asked if it was impossible to stir Parliament but acknowledged that everything depended on Palmerston:  “that august body seems to be as afraid of him as the urchins of a village school of the birch of their pedagogue[698].”