Bright’s letter of November, 1861, was written before news of the Trent reached England:  that of January, 1862, just after that controversy had been amicably settled.  The Trent had both diverted attention from cotton and in its immediate result created a general determination to preserve neutrality.  It is evident that even without this threat of war there was no real cotton pressure upon the Government.  With Northern successes in the spring of 1862 hopes were aroused that the war would soon end or that at least some cotton districts would be captured to the relief of England.  Seward held out big promises based on the capture of New Orleans, and these for a time calmed governmental apprehensions, though by midsummer it was clear that the inability to secure the country back of the city, together with the Southern determination to burn their cotton rather than see it fall into the hands of the enemy, would prevent any great supply from the Mississippi valley[688].  This was still not a matter of immediate concern, for the Government and the manufacturers both held the opinion that it was not lack of cotton alone that was responsible for the distress and the manufacturers were just beginning to unload their stocks[689].  But in considering and judging the attitude of the British public on this question of cotton it should always be remembered that the great mass of the people sincerely believed that America was responsible for the distress in Lancashire.  The error in understanding was more important than the truth.

In judging governmental policy, however, the truth as regards the causes of distress in England is the more important element.  The “Cotton Lords” did not choose to reveal it.  One must believe that they intentionally dwelt upon the war as the sole responsible cause.  In the first important parliamentary debate on cotton, May 9, 1862, not a word was said of any other element in the situation, and, it is to be noted, not a word advocating a change in British neutral policy[690].  It is to be noted also that this debate occurred when for two months past, the numbers on poor relief in Lancashire were temporarily decreasing[691], and the general tone of the speakers was that while the distress was serious it was not beyond the power of the local communities to meet it.  There was not, then, in May, any reason for grave concern and Russell expressed governmental conviction when he wrote to Gladstone, May 18, “We must, I believe, get thro’ the cotton crisis as we can, and promote inland works and railroads in India[692].”  Moreover the Southern orders to destroy cotton rather than permit its capture and export by the North disagreeably affected British officials[693].  Up to the end of August, 1862, Russell, while writing much to Lyons on England’s necessity for cotton, did not do so in a vein indicative of criticism of Northern policy nor in the sense that British distress demanded special official consideration.  Such demands on America as were made up to this time came wholly from France[694].