if he was but making use of Northern victories to return to a high tone of warning to Europe—­a tone serviceable in causing foreign governments to step warily—­his time was well chosen.  Certainly at Washington Lyons did not regard very seriously Seward’s renewal of demand on belligerency.  Satisfied that there was no immediate reason to require his presence in America, ill and fearing the heat of summer, he had asked on May 9 for permission to take leave of absence for a trip home.  On June 6 he received this permission, evidence that Russell also saw no cause for anxiety, and on June 13 he took leave of Lincoln.

“I had quite an affectionate parting with the President this morning.  He told me, as is his wont, a number of stories more or less decorous, but all he said having any bearing on political matters was:  ’I suppose my position makes people in England think a great deal more of me than I deserve, pray tell ’em I mean ’em no harm[635].’”

Fully a month had now elapsed in London since the arrival of news on any striking military event in America.  New Orleans was an old story, and while in general it was believed that Richmond must fall before McClellan’s army, the persistence of Southern fervid declarations that they would never submit gave renewed courage to their British friends.  Lindsay was now of the opinion that it might be wise, after all, to make some effort in Parliament, and since the Washington mediation rumours were becoming current in London also, notice was given of a motion demanding of the Government that, associating itself with France, an offer of mediation be made to the contending parties in America.  Motions on recognition and on the blockade had been tried and had failed.  Now the cry was to be “peaceful mediation” to put an end to a terrible war.  Friends of the South were not united in this adventure.  Spence advised Lindsay to postpone it, but the latter seemed determined to make the effort[636].  Probably he was still smarting under his reverse of April.  Possibly also he was aware of a sudden sharp personal clash between Palmerston and Adams that might not be without influence on governmental attitude—­perhaps might even indicate a governmental purpose to alter its policy.

This clash was caused by a personal letter written by Palmerston to Adams on the publication in the Times of General Butler’s famous order in New Orleans authorizing Federal soldiers to treat as “women of the town” those women who publicly insulted Northern troops.  The British press indulged in an ecstasy of vicious writing about this order similar to that on the Northern “barbarity” of the Stone Fleet episode.  Palmerston’s letters to Adams and the replies received need no further notice here, since they did not in fact affect British policy, than to explain that Palmerston wrote in extreme anger, apparently, and with great violence of language, and that Adams replied with equal anger, but in very