quite agreed that nothing was to be done for the moment but to watch events[622].”  Thouvenel asked Slidell as to the effect of the loss of New Orleans, and received the frank answer, “that it would be most disastrous, as it would give the enemy the control of the Mississippi and its tributaries, [but] that it would not in any way modify the fixed purpose of our people to carry on the war even to an extermination[623].”  Mason, a Virginian, and like nearly all from his section, never fully realizing the importance of the Confederate South-West, his eyes fixed on the campaigns about Richmond, was telling the “nervous amongst our friends” that New Orleans would “form a barren acquisition to the enemy, and will on our side serve only as a stimulant[624].”

If the South needed such stimulants she was certainly getting repeated doses in the three months from February to May, 1862.  In England, Lindsay might be hopeful of a movement by the Tory opposition, but thought it wiser to postpone for a time further pressure in that direction.  May 8, Henry Adams could write to his brother of British public opinion, “there is no doubt that the idea here is as strong as ever that we must ultimately fail[625],” but on May 16, that “the effect of the news here [of New Orleans] has been greater than anything yet ... the Times came out and gave fairly in that it had been mistaken; it had believed Southern accounts and was deceived by them.  This morning it has an article still more remarkable and intimates for the first time that it sees little more chance for the South.  There is, we think, a preparation for withdrawing their belligerent declaration and acknowledging again the authority of the Federal Government over all the national territory to be absolute and undisputed.  One more victory will bring us up to this, I am confident[626].”

This was mistaken confidence.  Nor did governmental reaction keep pace with Southern depression or Northern elation; the British Ministry was simply made more determined to preserve strict neutrality and to restrain its French partner in a “wait for events” policy.  The “one more victory” so eagerly desired by Henry Adams was not forthcoming, and the attention, now all focused on McClellan’s slow-moving campaign, waited in vain for the demonstration of another and more striking evidence of Northern power—­the capture of the Confederate Capital, Richmond.  McClellan’s delays coincided with a bruiting of the news at Washington that foreign Powers were about to offer mediation.  This was treated at some length in the semi-official National Intelligencer of May 16 in an article which Lyons thought inspired by Seward, stating that mediation would be welcome if offered for the purpose of re-union, but would otherwise be resented, a view which Lyons thought fairly represented the situation[627].