determination of the South to maintain its independence, even under extreme reverses.  Upon enquiry by Lyons whether the South expected European assistance, Mercier “replied that the Confederate leaders professed to have abandoned all hope of succour from Europe,” and that confident in their own power they “desired no aid.”  Cautiously adverting to his suspicion that Mercier’s trip might have had in view French commercial advantage, Lyons asked whether France had received any proposals of benefit in return for recognition.  Mercier answered with a simple negative.  He then further developed the interview with Benjamin[599].

“He said that he had spoken while at Richmond as a friend of the Union, and a friend of all parties, but that the particular language which he had intended to hold was entirely inapplicable to the state of mind in which he found the Confederates one and all.  It was idle to tell them that they were worsted on all sides; that the time was come for making terms with the North.  What he had said to them about the recognition of their Independence was that the principal inducement to France to recognize it would be a hope that her doing so would have a great moral effect towards hastening peace; that at this moment it would certainly not have any such effect; that it would embroil France with the United States, and that would be all[600].”

Thus none of the strong representations intended to be made by Mercier to convince the South of the uselessness of further resistance had, in fact, been made.  In his report to Thouvenel, Mercier stated that he had approached Benjamin with the simple declaration “that the purpose of my journey was merely to assure myself, for myself, of the true condition of things; and that I called to beg him to aid me in attaining it.”  Since the proposed strong representations were not reported to Thouvenel, either, in the explanation given of the initiation of the trip, the doubt must be entertained that Mercier ever intended to make them.  They bear the appearance of arguments to Seward—­and in some degree also to Lyons—­made to secure acquiescence in his plan.  The report to Thouvenel omits also any reference to expressions, as narrated to Lyons, about recognition of the Confederacy, or a “principal inducement” thereto[601].  Mercier now declared to Lyons his own views on recognition: 

“He was himself more than ever convinced that the restoration of the old Union was impossible.  He believed that, if the Powers of Europe exercised no influence, the War would last for years.  He conceived that the Independence of the South must be recognized sooner or later; and in his opinion the Governments of Europe should be on the watch for a favourable opportunity of doing this in such a manner as to end the War.  The present opportunity would however, he thought, be particularly unfavourable.”

Lyons writes: