it, fearing that it would appear like a break in that unity of French-British attitude which was so desirable.  Nor was he without suspicion of a hidden French purpose to secure some special and separate advantages in the way of prospective commercial relations with the South.  Mercier told Lyons that he knew he could not ask Lyons to accompany him because of American “extreme susceptibility” to any interference by Great Britain, but he thought of taking Stoeckl, the Russian Minister, and that Stoeckl was “pleased with the idea.”  Lyons frankly replied that he was glad to be relieved of the necessity of declining to go and was sorry Mercier was determined to proceed since this certainly looked like a break in “joint policy,” and he objected positively on the same ground to Stoeckl’s going[596].  Mercier yielded the latter point, but argued that by informing Seward of his consultation with Lyons, which he proposed doing, the former objection would be obviated.  Finding that Mercier “was bent on going,” Lyons thought it best not to object too much and confined his efforts to driving home the idea that no opening should be given for a “separate agreement” with the South.

“I therefore entered with him into the details of his plans, and made some suggestions as to his language and conduct.  I said that one delusion which he might find it desirable to remove from the minds of men in the South, was that it would be possible to inveigle France or any other great European Power into an exclusive Alliance with them.  I had reason to believe that some of them imagine that this might be effected by an offer of great commercial privileges to one Power, to the exclusion of others.  I hardly supposed that Mr. Jefferson Davis himself, or men of his stamp could entertain so foolish a notion, but still it might be well to eradicate it from any mind in which it had found place[597].”

Lyons saw Mercier “two or three times” between the tenth and fourteenth and on the twelfth spoke to Seward about the trip, “without saying anything to lead him to suppose that I had any objection to it.”  This was intended to preserve the impression of close harmony with France, and Lyons wrote, “I consider that the result of my communications with M. Mercier entitles him to say that he makes his journey to Richmond with my acquiescence[598].”  Nevertheless he both believed, and declared to Mercier, that the views expressed on Southern weakening of determination were wholly erroneous, and that neither North nor South was ready for any efforts, still less mediation, looking toward peace.  He prophesied failure of Mercier’s avowed hopes.  His prophecy proved well founded.  On April 28 Lyons reported Mercier’s account to him of the results of the journey.  Mercier returned to Washington on April 24, reported at once to Seward the results of his trip, and on the same day called on Lyons.  Having conversed with Benjamin, the new Confederate Secretary of State, he was now wholly convinced of the settled