As agreed with Slidell, emphasis in this interview was laid by Mason on the blockade, though recognition was asked.  His report to Richmond shows that he proceeded with great caution, omitting portions of his instructions on cotton for fear of arousing antagonism, and venturing only a slight departure by expressing the hope that if Great Britain wished to renew communication with the Confederacy it might be made through him, rather than through the British consuls at the South.  Russell’s “only reply was, he hoped I might find my residence in London agreeable.”  He refused to see Mason’s credentials, stating this to be “unnecessary, our relations being unofficial.”  He listened with courtesy, asked a few questions, but “seemed utterly disinclined to enter into conversation at all as to the policy of his Government, and only said, in substance, they must await events.”  Certainly it was a cool reception, and Mason departed with the conviction that Russell’s “personal sympathies were not with us, and his policy inaction[564].”  But Mason still counted on parliamentary pressure on the Government, and he was further encouraged in this view by a letter from Spence, at Liverpool, stating that he had just received a request to come to London “from a government quarter, of all the most important[565].”

The summons of Spence to London shows that the Government itself feared somewhat a pro-Southern move in Parliament.  He reported to Mason that interviews had taken place with Palmerston and with Russell, that he had unfortunately missed one with Gladstone, and, while not citing these men directly, declared the general “London idea” to be that of “postponement”; since it was inevitable that “the North will break down in a few months on the score of money,” and that “We have only to wait three months.”  Evidently Spence believed he was being used as an intermediary and influential adviser in pro-Southern circles to persuade them to a period of quiet.  This, he thought, was unwise since delay would be injurious[566].  Of like opinion were the two Members of Parliament who were, throughout Mason’s career in England, to be his closest advisers.  These were Gregory and Lindsay, the former possessing somewhat of a following in the “gentleman-ruler” class, the latter the largest shipowner in Great Britain.  Their advice also was to press on the blockade question[567], as a matter of primary British commercial interest, and they believed that France was eager to follow a British lead.  This was contrary to Slidell’s notion at the moment, but of this Mason was unaware[568].