British dislike of France’s Mexican venture served to swell the breeze of amity toward America that had sprung up once the Trent was beyond the horizon, and made, temporarily, for smooth sailing in the relations of Great Britain and the North.  Lyons wrote on February 7 that the “present notion appears to be to overwhelm us with demonstrations of friendship and confidence[551].”  Adams’ son in London thought “our work here is past its crisis,” and that, “Our victory is won on this side the water[552],” while the American Minister himself believed that “the prospect of interference with us is growing more and more remote[553].”  Russell also was optimistic, writing to Lyons, “Our relations have now got into a very smooth groove....  There is no longer any excitement here upon the question of America.  I fear Europe is going to supplant the affairs of America as an exciting topic[554],” meaning, presumably, disturbances arising in Italy.  On April 4 Adams described his diplomatic duties as “almost in a state of profound calm[555].”

This quiet in relation to America is evidence that no matter what anxiety was felt by British statesmen over the effects of the blockade there was as yet no inclination seriously to question its legality.  That there was, nevertheless, real anxiety is shown by an urgent letter from Westbury to Palmerston upon the blockade, asserting that if cotton brought but four pence at Charleston and thirteen pence at Liverpool there must be some truth in its alleged effectiveness: 

“I am greatly opposed to any violent interference.  Do not let us give the Federal States any pretence for saying that they failed thro’ our interference....  Patience for a few more weeks is I am satisfied the wiser and the more expedient policy[556].”

[Illustration:  KING COTTON BOUND:  Or, The Modern Prometheus. Reproduced by permission of the Proprietors of “Punch"]

This would indicate some Cabinet discussion, at least, on the blockade and on British trade interests.  But Westbury’s “few more weeks” had no place in Russell’s thought, for on February 15 he wrote to Lyons in regard to assertions being made that the blockade was ineffective because certain vessels had eluded it: 

“Her Majesty’s Government, however, are of opinion that, assuming that the blockade is duly notified, and also that a number of ships is stationed and remains at the entrance of a port, sufficient really to prevent access to it or to create an evident danger of entering or leaving it, and that these ships do not voluntarily permit ingress or egress, the fact that various ships may have successfully escaped through it (as in the particular instances here referred to) will not of itself prevent the blockade from being an effective one by international law[557].”

From this view Russell never departed in official instructions[558].  England’s position as the leading maritime Power made it inevitable that