“... the object of war is peace, and the purposes
of peace are mutual goodwill and advantageous commercial
intercourse[540].” To-day it seems absurd
that any save the most ignorant observer should have
thought the North contemplated a permanent and revengeful
destruction of Southern port facilities. Nor was
there any just ground for such an extreme British
view of the Northern plan. Yet even Robert Browning
was affected by the popular outcry. “For
what will you do,” he wrote Story, “if
Charleston becomes loyal again[541]?” a query
expressive of the increasing English concern, even
alarm, at the intense bitterness, indicating a long
war, of the American belligerents. How absurd,
not to say ridiculous, was this British concern at
an American “lapse toward barbarism” was
soon made evident. On January II Lyons, acting
on the instructions of December 20, brought up the
matter with Seward and was promptly assured that there
was no plan whatever “to injure the harbours
permanently.” Seward stated that there had
never been any plan, even, to sink boats in the main
entrance channels, but merely the lesser channels,
because the Secretary of the Navy had reported that
with the blockading fleet he could “stop up the
’large holes,’” but “could
not stop up the ‘small ones.’” Seward
assured Lyons that just as soon as the Union was restored
all obstructions would be removed, and he added that
the best proof that the entrance to Charleston harbour
had not been destroyed was the fact that in spite of
blockading vessels and stone boats “a British
steamer laden with contraband of war had just succeeded
in getting in[542].” Again, on February
10, this time following Russell’s instruction
of January 16, Lyons approached Seward and was told
that he might inform Russell that “all the vessels
laden with stone, which had been prepared for obstructing
the harbours, had been already sunk, and that it is
not likely that any others will be used for that purpose[543].”
This was no yielding to Great Britain, nor even an
answer to Russell’s accusation of barbarity.
The fact was that the plan of obstruction of harbours,
extending even to placing a complete barrier, had been
undertaken by the Navy with little expectation of
success, and, on the first appearance of new channels
made by the wash of waters, was soon abandoned[544].
The British outcry, Russell’s assumption in protest that America was conducting war with barbarity, and the protest itself, may seem at first glance to have been merely manifestations of a British tendency to meddle, as a “superior nation” in the affairs of other states and to give unasked-for advice. A hectoring of peoples whose civilization was presumably less advanced than that which stamped the Englishman was, according to Matthew Arnold, traditional—was a characteristic of British public and Government alike[545]. But this is scarcely a satisfactory explanation in the present case. For in the first place it is to be remarked that the sinking of obstructions