“If our ships can go in ballast for cotton to the Southern Ports it will be well, but if this cannot be done by agreement there will be surely, in the extent of 3,000 miles, creeks and bays out of which small vessels may come, and run for Jamaica or the Bahamas where the cargoes might be transhipped.  But it is not for Downing Street to suggest such plans to Cheapside and Tooley Street[530].”

A better knowledge of American geography would have made clear to Russell that if but seven Southern ports were effectively blockaded the remaining 2,550 miles of coast line would be useless for the export of cotton in any considerable amount.  His bays and creeks did indeed long provide access to small vessels, but these were not adequate for the transport of a bulky export like cotton[531].  To Russell, however, the blockade appearing negligible in probable effect and also not open to objection by neutrals if regularly established, it seemed that any immediate danger to British trade was averted by the final American action on the “Southern Ports” Bill.  It was not until the blockade did begin to be thoroughly effective that either the British public or Government gave it serious consideration.

Not again until late November did Russell return with any interest to the subject of the blockade and then it was again on an American effort which seemed to indicate the ineffectiveness of blockading squadrons and a plan to remedy this by unusual, even “uncivilized,” if not illegal, methods.  This was the “Stone Boat Fleet” plan of blocking Charleston harbour by sinking vessels across the entrance bar[532].  The plan was reported by Lyons and the news received in England at the most uncertain moment as to the outcome of the Trent controversy[533].  British press and Government at first placed no stress on it, presumably because of the feeling that in view of the existing crisis it was a minor matter.  In the same week Lyons, having been asked by Russell for an opinion on the blockade, answered: 

“I am a good deal puzzled as to how I ought to answer your question whether I consider the Blockade effective.  It is certainly by no means strict or vigorous along the immense extent of coast to which it is supposed to apply.  I suppose the ships which run it successfully both in and out are more numerous than those which are intercepted.  On the other hand it is very far from being a mere Paper Blockade.  A great many vessels are captured; it is a most serious interruption to Trade; and if it were as ineffective as Mr. Jefferson Davis says in his Message, he would not be so very anxious to get rid of it[534].”

This was a very fair description of the blockade situation.  Lyons, unaffected by irritations resulting from the Trent, showed the frame of mind of a “determined neutral,” as he was fond of describing himself.  His answer was the first given to Russell indicating a possibility that the blockade might, after all,