This permitted a warmth-creating impression to Englishmen of the “forthright yet friendly” tone of British diplomats when dealing with Seward.  So also did Russell’s instruction of August 8, not yet received by Lyons when he took the stage at Washington.  Yet there is a possibility that Lyons was in fact merely playing his part as Seward had asked him to play it.  On the next day, August 13, he acknowledged the receipt of Russell’s communication of July 24, in which it was stated that while Great Britain could not acquiesce in the “Southern Ports” Bill no final instructions would be sent until Lincoln issued a Proclamation.  Lyons now explained, “As Mr. Seward is undoubtedly at this moment opposed to closing the Ports, I have thought it wiser to be guided by him for the present as to the mode of communicating your decision about the matter[526].”  Is it possible that Seward really wished to have a “strong,” yet not “too strong” statement from Lyons in order to combat the advocates of the “Ports” Bill?  There are many ramifications of diplomatic policy—­especially in a popular government.  At any rate on August 16 Lyons could assure Russell that there “was no question now of issuing the Proclamation[527].”  And on the nineteenth could write officially that a Proclamation based on the Bill had indeed been issued, but without the objectionable fourth section[528].

The whole affair of the “Southern Ports” Bill occupies more space in the British Parliamentary Papers, and excited more attention from the British Government than it would seem to have merited from the Washington attitude toward it.  The Bill had been drawn by the Secretary of the Treasury, and its other sections related to methods of meeting a situation where former customs houses and places for the collection of import duties were now in the hands of the Confederacy.  The fourth section alone implied a purpose to declare a paper blockade.  The idea of proclaiming closed the Southern ports may have at first received the sanction of Seward as consistent with his denial of the existence of a war; or it may have been a part of his “high tone” foreign policy[529], but the more reasonable supposition is that the Bill was merely one of many ill-considered measures put forth in the first months of the war by the North in its spasm of energy seeking to use every and any public means to attack the South.  But the interest attached to the measure in this work is the British attitude.  There can be no doubt that Russell, in presenting papers to Parliament was desirous of making clear two points:  first, the close harmony with France—­which in fact was not so close as was made to appear; second, the care and vigour of the Foreign Secretary in guarding British interests.  Now in fact British trade was destined to be badly hurt by the blockade, but as yet had not been greatly hampered.  Nor did Russell yet think an effective blockade feasible.  Writing to Lyons a week after his official protest on the “Southern Ports” Bill, he expressed the opinion that a “regular blockade” could not possibly prevent trade with the South: