The fourth section of the Bill as introduced in Congress did not direct the President to issue a proclamation closing Southern ports—­it merely gave him the power to do so.  Almost from the first Lyons thought that Lincoln and Seward were too wise to issue such a proclamation[512].  Nevertheless it was his duty to be on guard and to oppose the plan.  For six weeks there was much communication in regard to the “Southern Ports Bill,” as all parties called it, from Russell to Lyons, and also with Cowley in France.  The British Foreign Office interest in the matter, almost rising to excitement, is somewhat astonishing in view of the small importance evidently attached to the plan at Washington and the reluctance of France to be as vigorous as Great Britain in protest.  Vigorous Russell certainly was, using a “high tone” in official remonstrance to America not unlike that taken by Seward on British recognition of Southern belligerency.

Immediately on learning of the introduction of the Bill Russell addressed enquiries to Cowley asking what France intended and urged a stiff protest.  Thouvenel had not heard of the Bill and was seemingly indifferent.  At first he acquiesced in Russell’s protest, then drew back and on three separate occasions promised support only to withdraw such promise.  He was disinclined, said Cowley, to join in a “friendly hint” to America because of the touchy sensibilities lately shown by Seward, and feared a direct protest might result in an American declaration of war.  In any case why not wait until the President did act, and even then the proper method would be a protest rather than “reprisals.”  “I wish,” wrote Cowley, on July 28, “that the French were inclined to be more bumptious, as they seemed to be at first.  I would at all times rather have the task of calming them, than of urging them on[513]....”  Nevertheless Russell on July 19 notified Lyons that England would not observe a “legislative closing” of Southern ports[514].  On July 12 Lyons telegraphed that the Bill had passed both Houses of Congress, and on the sixteenth he wrote privately to Russell that he was much disturbed over its possible consequences since “even Sumner was for it[515],” as this indicated a real intention to carry it into effect[516].  On August 8, Russell sent formal instructions of protest, a copy of which was to be handed to Seward, but the next day authorized Lyons to exercise discretion as to communicating the despatch[517].

The original form of this instruction, dated in June and revised in July, concluded with language that might well draw out Thouvenel’s objection to a threat of “reprisals.”  It read that “H.M.G. ... reserve ... the right of acting in concert with other Nations in opposition to so violent an attack on the rights of Commercial Countries and so manifest a violation of International Law[518].”  This high tone had been modified possibly by French opposition, possibly by Lyons’ early opinion