the United States claimed to be considered as Belligerents, or as a Government engaged in putting down a rebellion, was a violation of all those principles of Maritime international law, which France had ever supported[481] ...” and had instructed Mercier to so state to Seward.  This implied a reflection on former British practice, especially as regards the exercise of a right of search to recover its own citizens and is indicative of the correctness of Adams’ judgment that one main reason for European support of Great Britain in the Trent crisis, was the general desire to tie her to a limitation of belligerent maritime power.

In notifying Russell of the release of the prisoners, Lyons had stated that he would caution the Commander of the ship conveying them that they were “not to be received with honours or treated otherwise than as distinguished private gentlemen[482].”  Russell was equally cautious, seeing Mason, shortly after arrival in London, “unofficially at my own house,” on February 10, refusing to read his credentials, and after listening to a statement of his instructions, replying that “nothing had hitherto occurred which would justify or induce” Great Britain to depart from a position of neutrality[483].  Russell had already suggested that Thouvenel use the same method with Slidell[484].  This procedure does not necessarily indicate a change in governmental attitude, for it is exactly in line with that pursued toward the Confederate Commissioners before the Trent; but the Trent controversy might naturally have been expected to have brought about an easier relation between Russell and a Southern representative.  That it did not do so is evidence of Russell’s care not to give offence to Northern susceptibilities.  Also, in relief at the outcome of the Trent, he was convinced, momentarily at least, that the general British suspicion of Seward was unfounded.  “I do not,” he wrote to Gladstone, “believe that Seward has any animosity to this country.  It is all buncom” (sic)[485].  Apparently it was beginning to be realized by British statesmen that Seward’s “high tone” which they had interpreted, with some justification earlier, as especially inimical to England, now indicated a foreign policy based upon one object only—­the restoration of the Union, and that in pursuit of this object he was but seeking to make clear to European nations that the United States was still powerful enough to resent foreign interference.  The final decision in the Trent affair, such was the situation in the American Cabinet, rested on Seward alone and that decision was, from the first, for peace.

Nor did Seward later hold any grudge over the outcome.  America in general, however, though breathing freely again as the war cloud passed, was bitter.  “The feeling against Great Britain is of intense hatred and the conclusion of the whole matter is, that we must give up the traitors, put down the rebellion, increase our navy, perfect the discipline of the 600,000 men in the field, and then fight Great Britain[486].”  Lowell, in one of the most emotional of his “Bigelow Papers,” wrote, on January 6, 1862: