how loud the talk or deep the feeling.  Seward understood the change and had now received strong warnings from Adams and Weed in London, and from Dayton in Paris[471], but these were not needed to convince him that America must yield.  Apparently, he had recognized from the first that America was in an impossible situation and that the prisoners must be released if the demand were made.  The comment of those who were “wise after the event” was that true policy would have dictated an immediate release of the prisoners as seized in violation of international law, before any complaint could be received from Great Britain.  This leaves out of consideration the political difficulties at home of an administration already seriously weakened by a long-continued failure to “press the war,” and it also fails to recognize that in the American Cabinet itself a proposal by Seward to release, made immediately, would in all probability have been negatived.  Blair, in the Cabinet, and Sumner in the Senate, were, indeed, in favour of prompt release, but Lincoln seems to have thought the prisoners must be held, even though he feared they might become “white elephants.”  All that Seward could do at first was to notify Adams that Wilkes had acted without instructions[472].

On Christmas morning the Cabinet met to consider the answer to Great Britain.  Sumner attended and read letters from Bright and Cobden, earnestly urging a yielding by America and depicting the strength of British feeling.  Bright wrote:  “If you are resolved to succeed against the South, have no war with England; make every concession that can be made; don’t even hesitate to tell the world that you will even concede what two years ago no Power would have asked of you, rather than give another nation a pretence for assisting in the breaking up of your country[473].”  Without doubt Bright’s letters had great influence on Lincoln and on other Cabinet members, greatly aiding Seward, but that his task was difficult is shown by the fact that an entire morning’s discussion brought no conclusion.  Adjournment was taken until the next day and after another long debate Seward had the fortune to persuade his associates to a hearty unanimity on December 26.  The American reply in the form of a communication to Lyons was presented to him by Seward on the 27th, and on that same day Lyons forwarded it to Russell.  It did not contain an apology, but Lyons wrote that since the prisoners were to be released and acknowledgment was made that reparation was due to Great Britain, he considered that British demands were “so far substantially complied with” that he should remain at his post until he received further orders[474].