It has long been known to history, and was known to Adams almost immediately, that the first draft of the instruction to Lyons was softened in language by the advice of Prince Albert, the material point being the expression of a hope that the action of Captain Wilkes was unauthorized[421].  That instruction had been sent previous to the receipt of a report from Lyons in which, very fearful of results, he stated that, waiting instructions, he would preserve a strict silence[422].  Equally anxious was Cowley at Paris, who feared the realization of Seward’s former “foreign war panacea.”  “I wish I could divest myself of the idea that the North and South will not shake hands over a war with us[423].”  Considering the bitterness of the quarrel in America this was a far-fetched notion.  The efforts promptly made by the Confederate agents in London to make use of the Trent affair showed how little Cowley understood the American temper.  Having remained very quiet since August when Russell had informed them that Great Britain intended remaining strictly neutral[424], they now, on November 27 and 30, renewed their argument and application for recognition, but received in reply a curt letter declining any official communication with them “in the present state of affairs[425].”

The delay of at least three weeks imposed by methods of transportation before even the first American reaction to the British demand could be received in London gave time for a lessening of excitement and a more careful self-analysis by British statesmen as to what they really felt and desired.  Gladstone wrote:  “It is a very sad and heart-sickening business, and I sincerely trust with you that war may be averted[426].”  Argyll hurried home from the Continent, being much disturbed by the tone of the British press, and stating that he was against standing on technical grounds of international law.  “War with America is such a calamity that we must do all we can to avoid it.  It involves not only ourselves, but all our North American colonies[427].”  But war seemed to both men scarcely avoidable, an opinion held also by Cornewall Lewis[428] and by Clarendon, the latter standing at the moment in a position midway between the Whig and Tory parties[429].  Yet Russell, with more cause than others to mistrust Seward’s policy, as also believing that he had more cause, personally, to resent it, was less pessimistic and was already thinking of at least postponing immediate hostilities in the event of an American refusal to make just recompense.  On December 16 he wrote to Palmerston:  “I incline more and more to the opinion that if the answer is a reasoning, and not a blunt offensive answer, we should send once more across the Atlantic to ask compliance....  I do not think the country would approve an immediate declaration of war.  But I think we must abide by our demand of a restoration of the prisoners....  Lyons gives a sad account of Canada.  Your foresight of last year is amply justified[430].”  And on December 20 he wrote, “Adams’ language yesterday was entirely in favour of yielding to us, if our tone is not too peremptory....  If our demands are refused, we must, of course, call Parliament together.  The sixth of February will do.  In any other case we must decide according to circumstances[431].”