This British anxiety and the efforts to prevent a dangerous complication occurred after the envoys had been seized but some two weeks before that fact was known in London.  “Adams,” wrote Russell, “says it was all a false alarm, and wonders at our susceptibility and exaggerated notions[413].”  But Russell was not equally convinced with Adams that the North, especially Seward, was so eager for continued British neutrality, and when, on November 27, the news of Captain Wilkes’ action was received, Russell and many others in the Cabinet saw in it a continuation of unfriendly Northern policy now culminating in a direct affront.  Argyll, the most avowed friend of the North in the Cabinet, was stirred at first to keen resentment, writing “of this wretched piece of American folly....  I am all against submitting to any clean breach of International Law, such as I can hardly doubt this has been[414].”  The Law Officers now held that “Captain Wilkes had undertaken to pass upon the issue of a violation of neutrality on the spot, instead of sending the Trent as a prize into port for judicial adjudication[415].”  This was still later further expanded by an opinion that the envoys could not be considered as contraband, and thus subject to capture nor the Trent as having violated neutrality, since the destination of the vessel was to a neutral, not to an enemy port[416].  This opinion would have prohibited even the carrying of the Trent into an American port for trial by a prize court.

But the British Government did not argue the matter in its demand upon the United States.  The case was one for a quick demand of prompt reparation.  Russell’s instruction to Lyons, sent on November 30, was couched in coldly correct language, showing neither a friendly nor an unfriendly attitude.  The seizure of the envoys was asserted to be a breach of international law, which, it was hoped, had occurred without orders, and Lyons was to demand the restoration of the prisoners with an apology.  If Seward had not already offered these terms Lyons was to propose them, but as a preliminary step in making clear the British position, he might read the instruction to Seward, leaving him a copy of it if desired[417].  In another instruction of the same date Russell authorized a delay of seven days in insisting upon an answer by Seward, if the latter wished it, and gave Lyons liberty to determine whether “the requirements of Her Majesty’s Government are substantially complied with[418].”  And on December 1, Russell writing privately to Lyons instructed him, while upholding English dignity, to abstain from anything like menace[419].  On November 30, also, the Government hurriedly sent out orders to hold the British Fleet in readiness, began preparations for the sending of troops to Canada, and initiated munitions and supply activities.  Evidently there was at first but faint hope that a break in relations, soon to be followed by war, was to be avoided[420].