“As to North America, our best and true policy seems to be to go on as we have begun, and to keep quite clear of the conflict between North and South....  The only excuse [for intervention] would be the danger to the intervening parties if the conflict went on; but in the American case this can not be pleaded by the Powers of Europe.

“I quite agree with you that the want of cotton would not justify such a proceeding, unless, indeed, the distress created by that want was far more serious than it is likely to be.  The probability is that some cotton will find its way to us from America, and that we shall get a greater supply than usual from other quarters.

“The only thing to do seems to be to lie on our oars and to give no pretext to the Washingtonians to quarrel with us, while, on the other hand, we maintain our rights and those of our fellow countrymen[395].”

In Washington the result of Mercier’s conversation with Seward, outlining Thouvenel’s suggestions, was a long and carefully prepared despatch to Dayton, in Paris, which the biographer of Seward thinks was one of his “great despatches; perhaps it was his greatest, if we consider his perfect balance and the diplomatic way in which he seemed to ignore what was menacing, while he adroitly let Thouvenel see what the result would be if the implied threats should be carried out[396].”  Seward argued with skill the entire matter of cotton, but he was none the less firm in diplomatic defiance of foreign intervention.  Since Great Britain had taken no part in the French scheme—­a point which Seward was careful to make clear to Dayton—­the despatch needs no expanded treatment here.  Its significance is that when reported to Lyons by Mercier (for Seward had read it to the latter) the British Minister could pride himself on having already pointed out to both Mercier and Russell that Seward’s line was exactly that which he had prophesied.  Mercier again was very anxious that his confidences to Lyons should not become known, and Lyons was glad indeed to be wholly free from any share in the discussion[397].

Two days after thus describing events, Lyons, on November 6, had still another communication, and apparently a last on this topic, with Mercier, in which the two men again went over the whole ground of national policy toward America, and in which their divergent views became very apparent.  The arguments were the same, but expressed with more vigour.  Mercier seems, indeed, to have attempted to “rush” Lyons into acquiescence in his policy.  Lyons finally observed to him that he “had no reason to suppose that Her Majesty’s Government considered the time was come for entertaining at all the question of recognizing the South” and asked what good such a step would do anyway.  Mercier replied that he did not believe that the North would declare war, and so it would be a step toward settlement.  To this Lyons took positive exception[398].  Lyons’ report of this conversation was written on November 8, a date which was soon to stand out as that on which occurred an event more immediately threatening to British-American relations than any other during the Civil War.