recognized the South and asserted that such a war would cause more suffering many times than all the suffering now caused by the shortage of cotton.  Yet Lyons felt compelled to use caution and conciliation in dealing with Mercier, because of the desire to preserve close harmony of attitude[390].  A few clays later Lyons’ comments seemed wholly justified when Mercier reported to him the tone of a conversation with Seward, after having left with him a copy of Thouvenel’s instruction.  Seward said plainly that the United States would go to war with any foreign power that tried to interfere and that the only way in which France could get cotton was by a Northern conquest of the South.  He acknowledged that the United States might be defeated, but he informed Mercier that France would at least know there had been a war.  On his part Mercier told Seward that in his opinion there was but one possible outcome in America—­separation—­and that he had advised Thouvenel that the true policy of England and France was to recognize the South and “bring about a peaceful separation.”  Lyons’ comment to Russell is that Seward had certainly taken a “high” tone—­evident justification of Lyons’ previously expressed opinion.  Seward had been very eager to learn whether England knew of Thouvenel’s instruction, to which Mercier replied “no,” and was now anxious that Russell should not reveal to Adams that Lyons had known the contents before delivery to Seward—­a caution with which Lyons was very content[391].

Lyons’ first report of Mercier’s ideas had been received in London at a rather critical moment.  On October 17, just after Adams’ complaint about Bunch and Russell’s answer, while waiting to see whether Seward would magnify that incident into a cause of rupture, and four days before Bunch’s “unsatisfactory explanation” had been received, Russell wrote to Palmerston: 

“There is much good sense in Mercier’s observations.  But we must wait.  I am persuaded that if we do anything, it must be on a grand scale.  It will not do for England and France to break a blockade for the sake of getting cotton.  But, in Europe, powers have often said to belligerents, Make up your quarrels.  We propose to give terms of pacification which we think fair and equitable.  If you accept them, well and good.  But, if your adversary accepts them and you refuse them, our mediation is at an end, and you may expect to see us your enemies.  France would be quite ready to hold this language with us.

     “If such a policy were to be adopted the time for it
     would be the end of the year, or immediately before the
     meeting of Parliament[392].”

Apparently Russell under the irritations of the moment was somewhat carried away by Mercier’s suggestion.  That it was but a briefly held thought has been shown by expressions from him already cited[393].  Nor was he alone in ministerial uncertainty[394], but Palmerston was not inclined to alter British policy.  October 18, he replied to Russell: